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ABSTRACT
Understanding Thought Disorder in Schizophrenia-Spectrum Disorders:
Exploring the Relation and Implications of Affect
Rachel Nicole Waford
June 6, 2013
The significance of affect in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders has received
considerable support, including its role in cognitive processing and executive function.
Findings examining affect and cognition in schizophrenia appear to parallel findings with
healthy controls: positive affect contributes to broad, top-down processing and negative
affect leads to narrow, bottom-up processing. This dissertation extends this exploration
to the study of affect and its role in thought disorder, a core, and yet enigmatic feature of
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders.
This dissertation examines the role of affective intensity and valence in thought
disorder severity. Self-reported affective intensity and valence were assessed with the
PANAS, and thought disorder severity was evaluated by scoring Rorschach protocols
using the Thought Disorder Inventory. The dissertation has two hypotheses: (1) affective
intensity is a more significant factor than affective valence in predicting the severity of
thought disorder in schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder, and (2) positive affect is
related to categories that reflect broader, more associative processing, while negative
affect is related to categories that reflect narrowed processing.
Both hypotheses were supported. Affective intensity significantly predicted
thought disorder severity and was a better predictor, overall, then affective valence.
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Furthermore, positive and negative affect were related to indicators of broad versus
narrow processing, respectively. Self-reported negative affect emerged as a particularly
salient variable in thought disorder severity and presentation. The current findings have
implications for our understanding of the mechanisms underlying thought disorder
severity in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, and the significance of affective experience
in this spectrum of illness.
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INTRODUCTION AND AIMS

“Naturally, I’m growing my father’s hair.” Such a remark likely evokes a variety
of responses. Some may feel confused but assume they just missed a critical piece of the
story. Another may presume that the individual speaking is more intelligent or even
poetic and, therefore, may be speaking with more sophisticated language. Finally, one
may induce that the person in question is exhibiting disordered thought that is indicative
of a minor slip or evidence of a chronic problem. No matter what the response, most
would likely conclude that the above statement lacks both clarity and logic, and is
somewhat odd. While these descriptions are relevant to the entire range of human
thought (McKenna & Oh, 2005), they are also specific to thought disorder, a significant
area of research that has spanned the last century. Historically, thought disorder was a
core feature of dementia praecox and later a sine qua non of schizophrenia (Levy et al.,
2010). For Paul Meehl, the above utterance was the “diagnostic bell-ringer” for
schizophrenia (1977, cited from Levy et al., 2010, p. 177).
In addition to disordered thought, schizophrenia is also characterized by positive
symptoms indicative of an excess of what is seen in healthy individuals (e.g., auditory
and visual hallucinations, delusional beliefs), negative symptoms indicative of an absence
of experience normally seen in healthy individuals (e.g., anhedonia, avolition, flat
affect), and notable cognitive decline or dysfunction. Affecting approximately 1% of
individuals in the United States, this chronic disorder has a negative impact on social and
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occupational functioning (American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed., text revision [DSM-IV TR], 2000; National Institute
of Mental Health [NIMH], 2009). Given the variety of symptoms characteristic of
schizophrenia, intragroup heterogeneity is also prevalent, with one individual with
schizophrenia potentially symptomatically quite different from another. Thus,
consideration of the variability of the clinical presentation of schizophrenia becomes
critical. The study of thought disorder, often viewed as a core feature of schizophrenia, is
of particular importance as detailed below.
Background and Significance
Thought disorder (see Table 1 for definition of terms) has been considered a
fundamental component of schizophrenia since Emil Kraepelin’s description of dementia
praecox in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Andreasen, 1982; Kring, Kerr, Smith, &
Neale, 1993; Levy et al., 2010). Kraepelin defined severe mental illness as disorders of
thought and mood, a conceptualization commonly referred to as the Kraepelinian
dichotomy (Lake, 2008). He concluded dementia praecox was distinguished by disorders
of self-expression, internal speech, and train of thought (Andreasen, 1982). Disordered
thought was further characterized by derailments in thinking (Lake, 2008; Levy et al.,
2010), specifically loose associations and incoherence (Levy et al., 2010). Eugen Bleuler
renamed Kraepelin’s dementia praecox as schizophrenia in 1911 to represent what
Bleuler conceptualized as a splitting of psychic functions (Andreasen, 1979a). Bleuler
paid particular attention to disordered thought, typified by associative loosening that was
both fundamental to schizophrenia (Andreasen, 1979a; McKenna & Oh, 2005) and
“always present” (Andreasen, 1979a, p. 1315). While both Kraepelin and Bleuler
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emphasized thought disorder as critical to the understanding of schizophrenia, Kraepelin
conceptualized thought disorder as “a train that was derailing” while Bleuler described it
as “torn and poorly mended fabric” (Andreasen, 1982, p. 293).
Bleuler’s conceptualization of schizophrenia also emphasized affective
disturbance as another core feature of the illness, identifying prominent delusions and
hallucinations as secondary symptoms (Kring et al., 1993). However, affective
symptoms did not gain importance in the understanding of schizophrenia until the
introduction of schizoaffective disorder by Jacob Kasanin in 1933 (Lake, 2008). It was
during this time that the prominence or absence of affective symptoms differentiated a
spectrum of schizophrenic disorders. However, thought disorder maintained its status as
a core feature of the illness and efforts continue to “capture the essence” (Levy et al.,
2010, p. 177) of schizophrenia.
Current Perspectives
Despite its lengthy history in the schizophrenia literature, the understanding of
and treatment for thought disorder has been far surpassed by research in other areas of
schizophrenia as evidenced by extensive reviews and treatment interventions devoted
specifically to the more prominent positive and negative symptoms of the illness (see
Wykes, Steel, Everitt, & Tarrier, 2008 and Kingdon & Turkington, 2008, respectively).
Against this backdrop, Levy et al. (2010) recently summarized the field by reporting
“general agreement that thought disorder is multidimensional, that it occurs in
schizophrenic and nonschizophrenic conditions, and that its manifestations cover a
spectrum of severity” (p. 177). Unfortunately, this broad summary appears to highlight
all that is not known by failing to differentiate thought disorder from the multitude of
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other psychiatric symptoms that are subsumed under that description. This recent
summary of the field, alone, reflects a need for continued, rigorous study of thought
disorder and perhaps speaks to the benefits of getting “back to the basics” of
psychopathology to re-examine thought disorder in schizophrenia.
The prevalence of thought disorder in a variety of different psychiatric
presentations including but not limited to mania, depression, and healthy individuals,
suggests that relevant findings within these groups may reveal something about thought
disorder in schizophrenia. The relationship between psychosis and thought disorder has
been examined in this regard across individuals with schizophrenia and affective
disorders. Specifically, efforts to explore the association between thought disorder and
hallucinations and delusions have resulted in inconsistent conclusions, a finding that will
be discussed at length. That thought disorder also occurs in disorders primarily
characterized by disturbances in affect also suggests that affect may be involved in
thought disorder, as it is relevant to a range of psychiatric illness (Cicchetti, Ackerman, &
Izard, 1995; Kring & Bachorowski, 1999). The aim of the current research is to explore
the possible role of affect as a moderator of the severity and presentation of thought
disorder in schizophrenia.
Assessments and Models of Thought Disorder
As the zeitgeist in our formulation of psychopathology has evolved, so has our
understanding of thought disorder. The works of Kraepelin and Bleuler emphasized a
disordered thought process that while bizarre, vague, and more effortful, was often not
flawed (McKenna & Oh, 2005). These early conceptualizations of thought disorder were
global, evaluating the intended thought as a whole. More recently, a debate has surfaced
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over the vague boundaries between disorders of thought, language, and speech, and has
led to inconclusive resolutions. Proponents for the use of the term speech disorder rather
than thought disorder focus on semantic activation and use of context (Levy et al., 2010),
syntax and phonology (Lanin-Kettering & Harrow, 1985), and referential words or
phrases (Docherty & Hebert, 1997). While there is no disagreement about a link between
thought, language, and speech, disagreement has focused on the use of disordered speech
as a proxy for disordered thought and the appropriateness of terms such as
“communication deviance” or “communication failures” (Levy et al., 2010, p. 179) to
describe the complex link between thought, language and speech.
This approach to understanding thought disorder is not novel; Kraepelin and
Bleuler also emphasized the importance of disorders of speech and language as vehicles
for conveying thought disorder, but identified disordered thought as the primary deficit
(Levy et al., 2010). Moreover, Vygotsky addressed this controversy in his classic work
on the distinction between thought and language: “Thought is not merely expressed in
words; it comes into existence through them. Every thought tends to connect something
with something else, to establish a relationship between things” (cited from LaninKettering & Harrow, 1985). Holzman, Shenton, and Solovay (1986) provided one
resolution to this debate by stating that language and speech are “transparent” (p. 361)
mediums of thought that can become the focus of evaluation, if one so chooses. The
current paper will be operating from the same perspective; the term “thought disorder”
will reflect examination of responses as a whole.
Measures of Thought Disorder
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The model of thought disorder to which one subscribes is directly related to the
measurement of thought disorder employed for research or clinical purposes. Because
the evaluation of thought disorder is subjective, whether one chooses to evaluate within a
sentence, from sentence to sentence, or the response in its entirety will directly impact the
nature of the measure used as well as any conclusions about the type, rate, and severity of
thought disorder (McKenna & Oh, 2005). Consistent with the perspective discussed
earlier, the current review only includes studies that utilized thought disorder measures of
full statements and responses. Measures that evaluate thought disorder in this fashion are
of two types. For the purpose of the current research these two types of measures will be
classified as severity and subtype. Examples of each type, including scoring procedures
and psychometric properties, are available in Table 2.
Despite the homogeneity one may expect from a more gestalt view of thought
disorder, there remains an underlying inconsistency regarding clear definitions of severity
and subtype. Despite Andreasen’s early efforts to develop reliable and valid definitions
of thought disorder (1979a), the operationalization of thought disorder remains fuzzy and
malleable (Andreasen 1979a; 1979b; 1982; Levy et al, 2010). This can be clearly seen in
the variability across the five major thought disorder assessments described in Table 2.
For example, a response that is extremely brief, concrete, and generally limited would
likely be identified as severe poverty of speech using the Scale for the Assessment of
Thought, Language and Communication (TLC; Andreasen, 1979a, 1979b), as defined in
Tables 1 and 2. However, this same response would receive a score of “0,” on the Index
of Positive Thought Disorder (IPTD; Marengo, Harrow, Lanin-Kettering, & Wilson,
1986), indicating the absence of thought disorder as described in Table 2. In addition,
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Nancy Docherty’s Communication Disturbance Index (CDI; Docherty, DeRosa, &
Andreasen, 1996) classifies word and phrase use into six categories of communication
failure; scores are based on the frequency of each failure and no severity scores, per se,
are noted. Rather than reflect theoretical differences, this and other measurement
discrepancies emphasize the inconclusive nature of thought disorder research findings,
and the need to revisit the study and measurement of this impairment. Inconsistencies
such as the one described above and the differences illustrated in Table 2 further suggest
a need to examine additional factors that may be related to thought disorder in an effort to
better establish a common ground.
Models of Thought Disorder
Similar to the heterogeneity reflected in the measures of thought disorder shown
in Table 2, there is also variability in the general model of thought disorder in
schizophrenia as indicated by factor analytic studies. While thought disorder is at times
considered a feature of positive symptoms as evidenced by its inclusion in descriptions
such as those provided by NIMH (2009) or in measures of positive symptoms such as the
Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS; Andreasen, 1984), factor analytic
studies of schizophrenia have shown factor structures that account for thought disorder as
an independent but related factor (Grube, Bilder, & Goldman, 1998; Kim et al., 2012;
Lancon, Auquier, Nayt, & Reine, 2000; Mojtabai, 1999; Toomey et al., 1997). These
findings suggest that thought disorder is an area worthy of individual study, including the
factor structure, unique correlates and moderators. However, as discussed below studies
specifically examining the factor structure of thought disorder in general and in
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schizophrenia yield inconsistent findings (see Table 3 for sample characteristics and
goodness of fit statistics).
In the validation of the TLC, Andreasen (1979b) examined a positive/negative
thought disorder dichotomy that was similar to the excess versus absence hypothesis
reflected in positive and negative symptoms in schizophrenia, respectively. Negative
thought disorder was operationalized as poverty of speech and poverty of content of
speech, and positive thought disorder included pressured speech, distractibility,
tangentiality, derailment, incoherence, and illogicality. Positive thought disorder was
significantly associated with acute schizophrenia and mania, and negative thought
disorder was significantly associated with chronic schizophrenia and poorer prognosis.
Harvey et al., (1992) sought to further examine the factor structure of eight TLC
elements (poverty of speech, poverty of content of speech, pressured speech,
tangentiality, derailment, incoherence, circumstantiality, and loss of goal) using five
confirmatory factor analytic models: (1) null model; (2) one-dimensional model of
severity; (3) positive/negative thought disorder from Andreasen (1979b) with the
inclusion of loss of goal on the positive factor; (4) a two factor model examining verbal
productivity (poverty of speech and pressured speech) and disconnection (poverty of
content of speech, tangentiality, derailment, incoherence, circumstantiality, and loss of
goal); and a (5) three-factor model with poverty of speech, pressured speech,
circumstantiality, and loss of goal on factor 1, incoherence and derailment on factor 2,
and poverty of content of speech and tangentiality on factor 3. Goodness-of-fit indices
revealed that the two-factor verbal productivity/disconnection model was the best-fitting
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model, followed by the three-factor model. Contrary to Andreasen’s earlier findings
(1979b), the positive/negative thought disorder model failed to emerge as a solution.
Expanding on Harvey et al. (1992), Cuesta and Peralta (1999) examined eight
hypothetical models ranging from one to six factors, all of which included all 18 -thought
disorder elements from the TLC. Confirmatory factor analyses revealed that the best
fitting model was comprised of 6 dimensions: negative (poverty of speech, poverty of
content of speech, and perseveration); idiosyncrasies (word approximations and stilted
speech); semantics (clanging and neologisms); attention (distractible speech and
blocking); reference (echolalia and self-reference); and disorganization (pressured
speech, tangentiality, derailment, incoherence, illogicality, circumstantiality, and loss of
goal).
While the studies above support the continued interest in examining thought
disorder in schizophrenia, they have facilitated little progress toward a deeper
understanding of the mechanisms of thought disorder in this population. The speech
versus thought disorder controversy is not the only significant discrepancy; the study of
thought disorder has been fraught with definitional differences (Andreasen 1979a; 1979b;
1982; Levy et al., 2010) that are echoed in the heterogeneity of measures and models of
thought disorders described above. Unfortunately, factor analytic studies of thought
disorder have focused solely on the TLC. Moreover, the use of the TLC varied across
these three studies; two studies used only a subset of thought disorder elements from the
TLC without any explanation for this procedure (Andreasen, 1979b; Harvey et al., 1992).
Unfortunately, thought disorder is, at best, vaguely defined. Therefore the current
research follows the conceptualization of Holzman et al. (2005), in which thought
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disorder is described as an impairment or deviation of thought measured through speech
and characterized, in part, by the following: “…a jarring disconnection between words
spoken and their consensual meaning, sudden, unexpected changes in the topic under
discussion, a rhythmic repetition of phrases, obscure references to tangential topics, and
even neologisms…” (p. 55).
Thought Disorder in Schizophrenia
As described at length above, the study of thought disorder has a rich history but
is burdened by many interpretations about what thought disorder is, and what it isn’t. To
provide a context to examine affect as a moderator of the severity and presentation of
thought disorder in schizophrenia, the next section will review studies relevant to the
conceptualization of thought disorder. Refer to Table 3 for sample and study
characteristics.
Course and Severity of Thought Disorder: The Chicago Follow-Up Study
The Chicago Follow-up Study (CFS) is a longitudinal, multidisciplinary study
focusing on the course of psychosis and adjustment in adults with schizophrenia
(Marengo et al., 1986). Of particular interest in this project are the prevalence, course,
severity, and relation to adjustment of thought disorder in schizophrenia and other
psychotic and nonpsychotic disorders (Marengo et al., 1986). Psychosis and psychotic
disorders were defined by current experiences of delusions and/or hallucinations
(Marengo et al., 1986). The CFS utilized the Index of Positive Thought Disorder (IPTD)
to assess bizarre-idiosyncratic thinking and separation from reality on a continuum from
absent to severe. Participants in this large study were comprised of an inpatient sample
diagnosed primarily using Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC; Spitzer, Endicott, &
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Robbins, 1978) that specify exclusions for any affective episode. Efforts were made to
evaluate patients within the first few weeks of admission to obtain data from an acute,
medication-free sample. This subsection will review significant studies from the CFS
project related to the goal of the current research.
Harrow, Grossman, Silverstein, and Meltzer (1982) examined acute thought
disorder in 35 individuals with schizophrenia at admission and a subsample seven weeks
later; twenty-five members of the acute sample were medication-free. Of the sample
measured at index, 50% exhibited severe thought disorder and 29% exhibited moderate
thought disorder, revealing that 79% of the schizophrenia sample showed definite
evidence of thought disorder as defined by the IPTD (Marengo et al., 1986). Thought
disorder was examined seven-weeks later in 21 of 35 individuals from the acute phase;
76% percent of this subsample were receiving antipsychotic medication and fewer than
50% of this sample were psychotic at follow-up as defined by the CFS project (see above
description). Forty-eight percent of individuals continued to exhibit severe thought
disorder, followed by 14% exhibiting moderate thought disorder, suggesting that thought
disorder persisted despite antipsychotic medication. Only a trend toward a reduction in
thought disorder severity emerged during this phase of treatment.
Similar findings emerged in an examination of thought disorder at admission and
one year follow-up (Harrow, Grossman, Silverstein, Meltzer, & Kettering, 1986a). In a
sample of 30 individuals with schizophrenia, 49% showed severe thought disorder at the
acute stage of assessment and 26.5% exhibited moderate thought disorder, with a total of
75.5% of the sample exhibiting definite thought disorder. At follow-up, 27% of
individuals displayed severe thought disorder, followed by 26.5% exhibiting moderate
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thought disorder. While no information was provided about medication status in the
acute stage of assessment, 77% of the sample was taking psychotropic medications at
follow-up (91% on antipsychotic medication), again suggesting that thought disorder
persisted at a moderate to severe level despite medication. Furthermore, there were no
significant differences in thought disorder severity between unmedicated individuals and
individuals taking antipsychotic medication at follow-up.
Harrow, Marengo, and McDonald (1986b) examined the early course of
schizophrenia, specifically addressing whether persistent thought disorder occurs as part
of an enduring illness or as part of a new episode of illness. Forty-eight individuals with
schizophrenia were assessed at hospital admission and one and half years later. Eightythree percent of individuals were on antipsychotic medications at index and 52% at
follow-up. During the acute stage, 56% of the sample exhibited severe thought disorder,
followed by 25% who displayed moderate thought disorder (81% showed definite
thought disorder, overall). At follow-up 27%, of the sample exhibited severe thought
disorder, followed by 17% displaying moderate thought disorder. While there was a
significant decrease in thought disorder severity from the acute stage (M = 3.54) to
follow-up (M = 2.70), results revealed that thought disorder (at all levels of severity) most
often occurred in the context of a chronic, enduring illness. Moreover, thought disorder
did not appear to occur in isolation, but as part of a larger cluster of chronic symptoms or
a new acute disturbance. Individuals hospitalized at follow-up showed more severe
thought disorder than those not hospitalized, and individuals medicated at follow-up
showed more severe thought disorder than unmedicated patients. While all but one of the
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individuals exhibiting severe thought disorder at follow-up exhibited psychosis as defined
by the CFS, this relationship was not explicitly examined.
In an effort to further examine the course and persistence of thought disorder,
Harrow and Marengo (1986) examined thought disorder in a sample of 44 individuals
with schizophrenia at two time points following hospitalization: 1.5 – 2 years after
discharge (FU1); and two years after follow-up 1 (FU2). The authors specifically
examined four trajectories of thought disorder: absent (no thought disorder at FU1 or
FU2); acute (thought disorder at FU1 but not FU2); episodic (thought disorder at FU2 but
not FU1); and persistent (thought disorder at both). Fifty-three percent of the sample was
receiving antipsychotic medication at FU1 and 59% at FU2. At FU1, 24% exhibited
moderate thought disorder, followed by 21% exhibiting severe thought disorder.
Following the evaluation at FU2 (3.5 - 4 years after discharge), 24% of the sample
showed an absence of thought disorder over time, 13% exhibited only acute thought
disorder, 24% exhibited an episodic course, and 39% showed a persistent course of
thought disorder over a four-year period.
Building on the early research from the CFS mentioned above, Marengo and
Harrow (1997) evaluated the longitudinal course of thought disorder at admission, and
again 2, 4.5, and 7.5 years after admission. Of the forty-five individuals with
schizophrenia evaluated, 71% exhibited thought disorder at index. Twenty-four percent
of the sample were on no medication at any of the three follow-ups, 31% were on
medication during at least one or two follow-ups, and 45% were on medication at all
follow-ups. The mean severity ratings at 2, 4.5, and 7-year follow-up were 2.8, 3.0, and
3.0, respectively; severity correlated significantly and positively across all time points.
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At the second year follow-up, 51% of the sample showed no thought disorder, 27%
showed definite signs of abnormal thinking, and 27% displayed severe thought disorder.
At 4.5 years after admission, 42% exhibited no thought disorder, followed by 20%
showing moderate, and 38% displaying severe thought disorder. Finally, 36% showed no
thought disorder at 7.5-year follow-up, 22% displayed moderate thought disorder and
42% exhibited severe thought disorder. Using the procedure from Harrow and Marengo
(1986) to examine trajectories of thought disorder, 18% showed no thought disorder at
any follow-up evaluation, 18% exhibited an episodic, infrequent course (thought disorder
at one follow-up), 40% displayed an episodic, frequent course (thought disorder at two
follow-ups), and 24% showed a persistent course (thought disorder at all three followups). While thought disorder was associated with psychosis as defined by the CFS at 2year follow-up, further examination of the course of thought disorder in relation to
psychosis was nonsignificant, suggesting that thought disorder occurred independent of
psychosis.
Marengo and Harrow (1985) directly examined the relationship between
psychosis and thought disorder in a sample of eighty-five individuals with schizophrenia.
Results showed no difference in thought disorder severity between the 63% on
antipsychotic medication and those unmedicated, and psychosis was shown to be
unassociated with thought disorder in this sample.
Overall, results from the CFS consistently reveal a significant and persistent
course of thought disorder in hospitalized patients with schizophrenia. Furthermore,
thought disorder endured despite antipsychotic medication. However, findings regarding
the relationship between psychosis and thought disorder, and differences between
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medicated and unmedicated individuals were mixed. Additional examination of these
groups, including remission rates for psychosis are needed to better understand these
relationships. While thought disorder persisted despite medication, it must also be noted
that more severe individuals were more likely to receive medication, thereby making this
cause-effect relationship unclear and in need of more exploration.
Subtypes and Associated Features of Thought Disorder
While the findings from the CFS highlight the persistence of thought disorder in
schizophrenia, methodologies that address subtypes focus on the presentation of thought
disorder elements within schizophrenia. Harvey, Earle-Boyer, and Wielgus (1984)
sought to examine the consistency of thought disorder in a sample of 20 inpatients with
schizophrenia receiving antipsychotic medication. These individuals were diagnosed
using the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd ed., (DSM-III,
American Psychiatric Association, 1980). Thought disorder was measured three times
over the course of ten days using the TLC. The authors examined two negative signs of
thought disorder (poverty of speech and poverty of content of speech) and five positive
signs of thought disorder (pressured speech, derailment, tangentiality, illogicality, and
incoherence), and found that ratings across these seven elements were significantly
related and stable across all three time points. Moreover, the authors examined
Andreasen’s positive/negative thought disorder dichotomy (1979b) and concluded that
schizophrenia was primarily characterized by poverty of speech, and negative thought
disorder, overall.
Andreasen and Grove (1986) examined the utility of the TLC for diagnosis and
prognosis in a sample of 50 inpatients with RDC -diagnosed (Spitzer et al., 1978)
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schizophrenia. The authors stated that “nearly all were medicated” but all were “severely
symptomatic” (Andreasen & Grove, 1986, p. 350). The participants were assessed on all
eighteen elements of the TLC during the first week of their admission, and six months
later. Results showed that the sample displayed “empty” and “disorganized” thought
disorder at index (Andreasen & Grove, 1986, p. 351), as defined by a higher frequency of
poverty of speech and poverty of content of speech, and derailment, incoherence, and
illogicality, respectively. At six-month follow-up, this sample continued to show
persistent disorganization with significant improvement only in pressured speech and
incoherence.
Harvey, Docherty, Serper, and Rasmussen (1990) examined thought disorder
eight months after hospital admission in 22 individuals with DSM-III- (American
Psychiatric Association, 1980) diagnosed schizophrenia. Approximately 80% were
receiving antipsychotic medications at follow-up, accompanied by anticholinergic
treatments in approximately 70% of the entire sample. Negative thought disorder, as
identified by poverty of speech and poverty of content of speech from the TLC, was
shown to be a stable trait in this sample of individuals with schizophrenia. Positive
thought disorder, as identified by pressured speech, derailment, tangentiality,
incoherence, and illogicality, was also shown to be stable in this sample and related to the
presence of psychosis (presence of delusions and/or hallucinations) at 8-month follow-up.
The results from this subset of studies are similar to those of the CFS, suggesting
that thought disorder endures despite medication, and a weak relationship exists between
psychosis and thought disorder. While the findings suggest heterogeneity of thought
disorder, negative thought disorder might be particularly salient in schizophrenia.
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Review of Thought Disorder in Schizophrenia: Problems with Methodology
Taken together, studies of thought disorder in schizophrenia illustrate that a
significant number of hospitalized individuals with schizophrenia exhibit definite
abnormalities in thought, with a higher percentage showing moderate and severe thought
disorder in the majority of studies. Results further suggest that thought disorder in
schizophrenia is often frequent and persists as part of an unremitting illness. Finally,
findings suggest that thought disorder in schizophrenia may be primarily characterized by
poverty of speech and poverty of content of speech (Andreasen, 1979b; Andreasen &
Grove, 1986; Harvey & Brault, 1986; Harvey et al., 1984; Taylor et al., 1994). Mixed
results for the relationship between psychosis and thought disorder suggest a trend for
different symptom courses. However, additional investigation of the remission rates for
psychosis compared to thought disorder is needed to further clarify this association. That
thought disorder only mildly remits even with antipsychotic medication also supports the
need to further explore the relationship with psychotic symptoms, and revisit thought
disorder generally in schizophrenia, including reconsidering effective interventions.
However, several methodological problems limit the generalizability of findings
and have likely contributed to the narrowed understanding of thought disorder today.
First and foremost, the samples used in CFS research were likely overlapping across
studies; this procedure limits the strength of the findings. Furthermore, comparisons of
medicated versus unmedicated individuals do not clearly reveal whether thought disorder
fails to remit despite medication, or whether individuals who are more severely
symptomatic are simply receiving more medication and not responding as expected. This
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is an important consideration for later work not only for the proposed relationship of
affect and thought disorder, but also the implications for treatment of thought disorder.
The conclusions regarding a positive/negative dichotomy should also be
interpreted with caution as a closer look reveals that this conceptualization represents an
oversimplification of the prevalence of thought disorder elements in schizophrenia, and
the heterogeneity of thought disorder in schizophrenia, more generally. While signs of
negative thought disorder were shown to occur at a high frequency in schizophrenia,
elements commonly associated with positive thought disorder occurred at an equal
(Andreasen & Grove, 1986) or greater (Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Harvey et al., 1990;
Harvey et al., 1984) frequency in this population. This further supports the need for a
better understanding of thought disorder, as it appears that interpretations about the
characteristic nature of negative thought disorder in schizophrenia do not fully account
for the heterogeneity of this impairment in this population.
The guidance and momentum needed for continued study in this area is also
lacking. Speculations about mechanisms of thought disorder have often occurred in a
vague manner; very rarely did any of the above studies make explicit inferences about
specific mechanisms or moderators, or identify specific areas in need of further research.
Some studies implicated an underlying impairment such as frontal lobe pathology
(McGrath, 1991), central nervous system dysfunction (Holzman et al., 1986), or speech
disorder (Harvey & Brault, 1986; Harvey et al., 1984), while others have broadly
implicated a set of factors, such as “ multiple factors, some of which are common to
various diagnostic groups, and some of which may be more specific to certain types of
thought-disordered patients” (Marengo & Harrow, 1985, p. 40). Moreover, conclusions
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made vague allusions to “different underlying cognitive processes” (Harvey & Brault,
1986, p. 171), “different cognitive processes” (Holzman et al., 1986, p. 370), “different
mechanisms” (Taylor, Reed, & Berenbaum, 1994, p. 325), and a need for a continued
search of “mechanisms that sustain more persistent forms of thought disorder in
schizophrenia…” (Marengo & Harrow, 1997, p. 282). Psychosis, social
inappropriateness, blending of self-referential material during communication, and acute
illness have also been implicated as factors related to thought disorder severity, course,
and presentation in schizophrenia (Harrow et al., 1982; Harrow et al., 1986b). Finally,
affective mechanisms have been identified as possible explanatory factors of thought
disorder in schizophrenia, with particular emphasis on the distress, anxiety, emotional
intensity, and excessive affect associated with more acute phases of the illness
(Andreasen, 1979b; Harrow et al., 1986a; 1986b). These latter speculations represent
viable areas of further study.
While the assessment and methodological concerns discussed above are
significant, they are likely representative of a more fundamental issue; the
conceptualization of thought disorder excludes moderating factors, particularly affect.
Returning to the basics of what we know about the continuum from “normal” to
pathology, decades of research implicate affect as an integral component of how
individuals understand and convey their experience with their environment (Cicchetti et
al., 1995; Kring & Bachorowski, 1999). Therefore, it appears that affect may be a
moderator that helps explain the unique severity and presentation of thought disorder in
schizophrenia reported in the literature. Specifically, the current research proposes that
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affective intensity and valence moderate the severity and presentation of thought disorder
in schizophrenia.
Affect and Thought Disorder in Schizophrenia
While affect, mood, and emotion are used somewhat interchangeably to describe
emotional experience and expression, the literature suggests distinct states. Batson,
Shaw, and Oleson (1992), describe affect as the most general and primitive state that
informs the individual about preferences or circumstances that are most valued. Mood is
further described as a type of affective state that illustrates a tone and level of intensity,
and reflects expectations about future events (i.e., positive mood if positive affect and
outcomes are expected). Finally, emotion, also a type of affective state and therefore
subjected to varying valence and intensity, reflects identification of a specific goal and
access to that goal in the present. While examination of emotional states could therefore
occur at any one of the above levels, the current review will focus on affect more broadly,
with the understanding that mood and emotion are subsumed under affect as these terms
are often used synonymously as representative of a general emotional state.
Affect and Cognition
Research examining the impact of affect on cognitive processes in healthy
individuals suggests that positive affect increases activation of associated networks,
allowing for increased efficiency and creativity in a variety of different cognitive
processes (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Bar, 2009; Clore & Palmer, 2009; Fredrickson,
2001). A reciprocal relationship is also present, with more broad activation contributing
to positive affect (Bar, 2009).
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Conversely, negative affect contributes to narrow, bottom-up processing (Bar,
2009; Clore & Palmer, 2009) such as the ruminative processes seen in individuals
experiencing depression (Bar, 2009). Schizophrenia studies have found a similar impact
of negative affect on cognitive processes. In a sample of individuals with schizophrenia,
Halari, Mehrotra, Sharma, & Kumari (2006) found that self-reported feelings of
depression and dejection were related to poor performance on measures of attention
(adjusted R2 = 0.14, p < .05), executive function (B = -0.50, adjusted R2 = 0.24, p < .05),
and verbal memory (B = -0.47, adjusted R2 = 0.24, p < .05). Tension and anxiety also
predicted poor verbal memory (B = -0.73, adjusted R2 = 0.24, p < .05)
Nancy Docherty and her colleagues (Docherty, Evans, Sledge, Seibyl, & Krystal,
1994a; Docherty & Herbert, 1997; Docherty, Sledge, & Wexler, 1994b) have consistently
shown that discussion of self-reported stressful/unpleasant and pleasant situations elicit
negative and positive affect, respectively, in individuals with schizophrenia.
Furthermore, this work has shown that discussion of events that bring about negative
affect contribute to increased communication disturbances as measured by deficits in
communicating meaning and reference failures from the CDI. Mean differences in
reference disturbance were found for pleasant/low stress conditions and unpleasant/high
stress conditions (MLow = 1.8 versus MHigh = 3.5, p < .001, Docherty et al., 1994a; MPositive
= .092 versus MNegative = .098, p < .05, Docherty, Sledge, & Wexler, 1994b; MPositive =
2.45 versus MNegative = 3.42, p < .01, Docherty & Herbert, 1997). Similarly, Burbridge
and Barch (2002) found that negative-valenced, open-ended questions elicited more
unclear references as measured by the CDI (MNegative = 3.3 versus MNeutral = 1.9), and
correlated with measures of selective attention (r = .40, p < .05).
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Affective intensity has also been shown to moderate the relationship between
affect and cognition (Larsen & Diener, 1987). Low versus high affect intensity
differentially affects attention, information processing and encoding strategies during
positive and negative mood states (Basso, Schefft, & Hoffman, 1994; Larsen & Diener,
1987). For example, a sample of female college students who reported low affective
intensity and experienced a positive mood induction performed better on a word
recognition task than those in the negative mood induction group. Conversely,
participants who reported high affective intensity and experienced neutral or negative
mood inductions recognized more words than those in the positive induction condition
(Basso et al., 1994). Thus, affective intensity may be a moderator between affective
valence and cognition.
Affective intensity also appears to be dispositional and associated with a tendency
toward particular cognitive processes or perspectives (Larsen, Diener, & Cropanzano,
1987; Schimmack & Diener, 1997) a finding that holds across affective valence (Larsen
& Diener, 1987). It has been found that individuals who report high affective intensity
also report using increased personalization, selective abstraction, and overgeneralization
processing strategies when viewing positive- and negative-valenced pictures compared to
those with low affective intensity who engaged in these operations much less so (Larsen,
et al., 1987). Those who reported high affective intensity have also been shown to
exhibit a processing style that is more global and elaborative, personalized, and empathic
in response to valenced-pictures compared with low-intensity individuals who were less
likely respond in that manner (Larsen, et al., 1987).
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While healthy individuals may joke about word-finding difficulties, distractibility,
and disorganization during periods of strong negative or positive affect, these anecdotes
build on what has been found in the affect and cognition literature: positive affect and
increased activation of associated networks may contribute to an abundance of
information that may be difficult to filter and lead to disordered thought, and negative
affect and narrow processing may lead to limited or perseverative responding. It is
expected that this relationship is present in psychiatric populations, albeit at a much
greater rate and degree of severity. Given what we know about the relationship between
affect and cognition, viewing thought disorder as a cognitive process similar to others
suggests that thought disorder may also be moderated by similar factors (e.g., affect)
(Goldberg & Green, 2002).
Affect and Thought Disorder
Research specifically examining affect and thought disorder is limited both in
breadth and depth, with respect to studies outside of affective disorders (i.e. bipolar
disorder) and schizoaffective disorder. However, the research that is available is
consistent. Individuals experiencing mania and thought disorder showed more mood
lability than those with mania and no thought disorder, and individuals with
schizophrenia (Jampala, Taylor, & Abrams, 1989). Bipolar patients exhibiting a normal,
non-depressed mood showed a higher proportion of immature responses, more examples
of thought disorder, and more severe thought disorder overall than healthy controls as
measured by the Rorschach Inkblot Test and Exner scoring system (Osher & Bersudsky,
2007), and individuals with mania who also exhibited emotional blunting presented
significantly more thought disorder elements than both individuals with mania but no
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evidence of emotional blunting and individuals with schizophrenia (Jampala, Abrams, &
Taylor, 1985).
Overall, these findings suggest that dysregulation of affect may be related to
increased thought disorder across a variety of groups. However, the following
methodological weaknesses limit the generalizability and strength of results: (1) the
samples in the above studies were quite variable, and small (see Table 3); (2) both
Jampala et al. (1985) and Jampala et al. (1989) utilized a measure of thought disorder that
was created by the authors and limited to discussion of the following elements: flight of
ideas (Jampala et al., 1989, only); neologisms; driveling; non-sequiters; tangentiality;
private use of words; and paraphasias; (3) the measure of mood lability discussed by
Jampala et al. (1989) was not explained; and (4) while the results from Jampala et al.
(1985) regarding emotional blunting were suggestive, emotional blunting was not
measured in the individuals with schizophrenia. Finally, none of these studies
acknowledged that mania could include positive mood (euphoria), negative mood
(irritability), or both. This is a particularly relevant methodological problem given the
robust findings regarding the role of positive and negative affect on cognitive processes,
and highlights the importance of examining affect in greater detail, paying specific
attention to the range of affective experience.
An indirect measure of affect in thought disorder in schizophrenia was illustrated
by examining thought disorder in core schizophrenia (emotional blunting and avolition)
and non-core schizophrenia (no loss of expression or history of prominent affective
disturbance, avolition possible) (Taylor et al., 1994). Results showed differences in
thought disorder between individuals with mania, schizoaffective disorder characterized
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by mania (SADm), and schizophrenia, with significantly more individuals with mania
and SADm exhibiting hyperverbal examples of thought disorder (defined by the authors
as rapid speech, pressured speech, circumstantiality, distractibility, flight of ideas,
clanging, and verbigeration), and significantly more individuals with schizophrenia
exhibiting hypoverbal examples of thought disorder (defined by the authors as slow
speech and paucity of speech). Within schizophrenia, hypoverbal features primarily
characterized individuals with core schizophrenia, while primarily hyperverbal features
characterized those with non-core schizophrenia.
This study again implicates the possible role of affect in thought disorder given
the differences in thought disorder in manic states and the manifestation of thought
disorder related to past and present affective disturbance in schizophrenia. While these
findings appear to support the positive/negative thought disorder dichotomy introduced
earlier, these findings suggest an alternative perspective: a continuum of affective
disturbance that may be related to thought disorder presentation and may impact thought
disorder in schizophrenia. While severity of thought disorder was not assessed in this
study, the moderating relationship of affect on the severity and presentation of thought
disorder proposed in the current research suggests that severity of thought disorder would
be moderated by affect in a similar fashion. Despite the significance of these latter
findings, the use of only clinician-rated measures of emotional expression and the vague
“present” versus “absent” measure of thought disorder pose problems for generalizing
these findings.
The studies above suggest promising results for the role of affect in the
conceptualization of thought disorder in schizophrenia. Unfortunately, the study by
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Taylor et al. (1994) is the only study found that examined affect and thought disorder in
schizophrenia, albeit indirectly. Therefore, we are left to extrapolate from the limited
research examining thought disorder and affect. However, that approach is extremely
weak given that none of the aforementioned studies measured affect, per se, leaving only
inferences about intensity and valence. In addition, only two of the four studies
addressed medication usage, quantified by months on antipsychotic medication (Jampala
et al., 1985; Jampala et al., 1989). This is a relevant oversight when considering the
impact of medication on affective symptoms (positive and negative) and the implications
for the proposed relationship in the current research.
Affect in Schizophrenia
Bleuler described affect as a core feature of schizophrenia with self-reported
emotional experiences often incongruent with outward expression. Conversely, Sándor
Radó suggested that the limited emotional expression in schizophrenia reflected a lack of
emotional experience altogether (cited from Kring et al., 1993). While most would argue
against the stringency of the latter point, our understanding of affective experience in
schizophrenia remains somewhat limited (Cohen & Minor, 2010). However, the research
that is available highlights the importance of affective experience in schizophrenia and
comes from both induction and non-induction paradigms.
Induction studies.
Emotional experience. It is now well documented that both positive and negative
emotions can be induced with affective stimuli in individuals with schizophrenia. These
induction paradigms present individuals valenced stimuli (pictures, words, etc.) and then
ask for ratings of their level of pleasantness/happiness/arousal, and/or
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unpleasantness/negative affect/aversion following discontinuation of the stimulus.
Studies using these induction paradigms with individuals with schizophrenia demonstrate
no differences between medicated versus unmedicated, inpatient versus outpatient, or
male versus mixed samples (Cohen & Minor, 2010). The level and intensity of induction
also remains consistent across modalities including gustatory (pleasant and aversive
drinks), visual (positive, negative, and neutral pictures), verbal (reading words of
differing valence), behavioral (facial gestures and social interactions) (Cohen & Minor,
2010), and physiological indicators (Kring & Caponigro, 2010). Individuals with
schizophrenia endorse pleasant emotions similar to or greater than that of controls when
exposed to these evocative stimuli (Cohen & Minor, 2010; Kring & Caponigro, 2010).
While individuals with schizophrenia demonstrate an affective experience that is
comparable to controls, some deficits do exist. Individuals with schizophrenia exhibit
less prosody during emotional topics when compared to controls (Alpert, Rosenberg,
Pouget, & Shaw, 2000), and have shown less arousal and change in response to
emotional topics both physiologically (Park, Gupta, & Kim, 2011) and neurologically
(Ursu, Kring, & Gard, 2011). Most importantly, individuals with schizophrenia
demonstrate difficulty reporting affective experience after a delay (Gold, 2011; Kring &
Caponigro, 2010; Ursu et al., 2011) and at times report affect that is incongruent with the
stimulus (Tremeau et al., 2009; Ursu et al., 2011), suggestive of the disconnection
between experience of emotion and its verbal expression.
Emotional expression. Emotional expression is often assessed through some
observable indicators. For individuals with schizophrenia, a clinician or another
collateral reporter often conducts this assessment. The distinction between experience
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and expression is significant because expression is often used as the primary evidence for
experience and the limited expression seen in schizophrenia conflates affective and
cognitive processes. It is possible that research examining negative symptoms in recent
years became the default for affect research in schizophrenia, as some symptoms such as
emotional blunting, flat affect, and anhedonia may, on the surface, appear to reflect
emotional states. However, robust findings illustrate that individuals with schizophrenia
show significant discrepancies between clinician-rated affective expression and selfreported affective experience (Agheveli, Blanchard, & Horan, 2003; Berenbaum &
Oltmanns, 1992; Healey, Pinkham, Richard, Kohler, 2010; Kring & Moran, 2008; StHilaire, Cohen, & Docherty, 2008). Specifically, flat affect has been shown to be
unrelated to emotional experience in schizophrenia (Kring & Moran, 2008) and negative
symptoms in schizophrenia are distinct and unrelated to depressive symptoms (Malla,
1995; Ulas, Akdede, Ozbay, Alptekin, 2008). These discrepancies appear to be unrelated
to antipsychotic medication treatment (Kring & Bachorowski, 1999; Kring & Earnst,
1999).
Non-induction studies. Similar to induction studies, non-induction studies (selfreported affect independent of induction paradigm) demonstrate that individuals with
schizophrenia experience significant levels of affect. Studies exploring affective
experience across valence show similar levels of positive and negative affect in
schizophrenia and healthy controls when asked to rate their current emotional experience
(Agheveli et al., 2003), and comparable percentages of positive and negative word use in
self-descriptions (St-Hilaire et al., 2008). Other work has emphasized increased baseline
levels of negative affect in schizophrenia including depression (Berenbaum & Oltmanns,
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1992; Halari et al., 2006), social anhedonia (Berenbaum & Oltmanns, 1992), and other
experiences such as anxiety, anger, and fatigue (Halari et al., 2006).
The research available suggests that individuals with schizophrenia can perceive
and report on their current emotional experience without stimulus induction, and are
reliable and valid reporters of this experience (Kring & Capongrio, 2010) with their
report correlating with clinician-ratings following semi-structured interview (Halari et al.,
2006). While it appears that schizophrenia may be characterized by more baseline
negative affect (e.g. depression), this conclusion should be interpreted with caution
because: (1) this area of research is limited; (2) much of the methodological focus is on
negative affect.
In sum, there is strong evidence that the “emotional system” in schizophrenia is
intact, although memory of the “in-the-moment” emotions may be inaccurate when
reported some time later (Ursu et al., 2011), a phenomenon not restricted to patients with
schizophrenia.
Thought Disorder In Affective and
Non-Schizophrenic Psychotic Disorders
While thought disorder is considered a core feature of schizophrenia, it also
occurs at a similar rate in individuals with bipolar disorder I (Andreasen, 1979b;
Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Harrow et al., 1982; Harvey et a., 1990; Harvey et al., 1984;
Holzman et al., 1986; Levy et al., 2010; Marengo & Harrow, 1985), and schizoaffective
disorder (Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Holzman et al., 1986), albeit more associated with
positive thought disorder in mania (Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Harvey & Brault, 1986;
Harvey et al., 1990; Harvey et al, 1984; Jampala et al., 1989; Taylor et al., 1994).
Furthermore, research suggests that thought disorder in mania is often more severe in
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acute stages (Harrow et al., 1982; Jampala et al., 1989; Marengo & Harrow, 1985) and
interestingly, thought disorder in SADm looks more similar to thought disorder in
schizophrenia than to mania in acute stages (Holzman et al., 1986). However,
examination of thought disorder longitudinally suggests that thought disorder remits
almost completely in mania (Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Jampala et al., 1989) and
somewhat in schizoaffective disorder (Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Marengo & Harrow,
1997), including significantly greater reductions overall in mania compared to
schizophrenia (Harrow et al., 1982). While evaluated in several studies, findings
regarding thought disorder and depression were often only vaguely discussed or
neglected altogether.
Similar to thought disorder research in schizophrenia, authors speculate about the
potential role of affective processes in the manifestation of thought disorder in mania by
implicating excessive affect (Andreasen, 1979b), distress and anxiety (Harrow et al.,
1986b) and emotional intensity (Harrow et al., 1986a) in the positive elements of thought
disorder often associated with mania. The speculations about schizoaffective disorder are
even more ambiguous, with discussion of the heterogeneous and “transitional” nature of
the diagnosis (Andreasen & Grove, 1986, p. 358) and the suggestion that the combination
of thought disorder, psychosis, and affective states may implicate a meaningful pattern
for schizoaffective disorder, specifically (Marengo & Harrow, 1997).
One area that is critical when considering the similarities in the acute phase and
longitudinal differences in thought disorder between individuals with schizophrenia and
those with mania or schizoaffective disorder is pharmacological treatments. However,
intergroup medication differences are not statistically explored in any of the
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aforementioned studies; only medicated versus unmedicated intragroup differences were
examined. With regard to the current argument for the role of affect in thought disorder,
this information is significant when considering that a large majority of those with mania
in the aforementioned studies received lithium (a mood stabilizer) or lithium combined
with antipsychotic medication at follow-up (see Table 3). One study reported significant
remission of thought disorder in mania over seven weeks when compared to individuals
with schizophrenia who received antipsychotic medication only (Harrow et al., 1982).
However, another study showed no difference in severity at one-year follow-up despite
differences in medication (Harrow et al., 1986a). Unfortunately, other studies that
exhibited differences in remission rates between those with mania and schizophrenia did
not discuss specific differences in pharmacological treatment (Andreasen & Grove, 1986;
Jampala et al., 1989). Additional support for the role of affect in thought disorder in
schizophrenia is illustrated by the findings from Marengo & Harrow (1997) that showed
a negative correlation for thought disorder symptoms and anti-depressant medication for
the total sample at baseline, and for schizophrenia only at two-year follow-up. However,
no specific information was provided about sample characteristics or other
pharmacological treatments for those receiving the anti-depressant medication.
Subsamples of studies primarily focused on the role of psychosis in thought
disorder have examined thought disorder in schizophrenia, psychotic but nonschizophrenic (PNS), and nonpsychotic groups (NP) (Harrow & Marengo, 1986; Harrow
et al., 1986b; Marengo & Harrow, 1985; Marengo & Harrow, 1997) (see Table 3 for the
diagnoses included in these categories). While literature discussed earlier illustrated
inconsistent results regarding the relationship between psychosis and thought disorder,
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this subsample of research suggested that thought disorder is more severe in
schizophrenia than PNS (Marengo & Harrow, 1985), and both PNS and NP at acute
stages (Harrow et al., 1986b) and 1.8 years after discharge (Harrow et al., 1986b).
Moreover, thought disorder was more persistent in schizophrenia than in schizoaffective
disorder, PNS, and NP groups, and more prevalent than in PNS and NP across 7.5-year
follow-up. Thought disorder in schizoaffective disorder was also more prevalent than in
NP groups (Marengo & Harrow, 1997). However, Harrow & Marengo (1986) found no
difference between schizophrenia and PNS at 1.5-2 year follow-up, or 3.5-4 year followup. Both of these groups showed more severe thought disorder than NP at 1.5-2 year
follow-up. Not only do these findings echo the inconsistent results discussed previously,
the methodologies also fail to consider the impact of affect, as PNS and NP samples were
heterogeneous with regard to affective states (see Table 3). PNS groups were primarily
comprised of individuals with major depression, mania, and schizoaffective disorder with
both depressed and manic subtypes, and NP groups were similarly comprised of
individuals with major depression, dysthymia and mania (Harrow & Marengo, 1986;
Harrow et al., 1986b; Marengo & Harrow, 1997). While the studies did acknowledge the
role of pharmacological treatments on psychosis by providing frequencies for
antipsychotic medication, these studies provided no discussion of anti-depressants or
mood stabilizers, treatments that were likely present given the samples used.
Although the prevalence of thought disorder in affective disorders illustrates that
thought disorder is not unique to schizophrenia, findings suggest that the course and
prognosis of thought disorder is often different in individuals with affective disorders and
schizoaffective disorders than schizophrenia; research further suggests that thought
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disorder is more state-dependent in mania and trait-dependent in schizophrenia (Levy et
al., 2010). This may be, in part, due to the differences in interventions implemented for
individuals with schizophrenia and those with affective disorders. Antipsychotic
medication is the preferred treatment for individuals with schizophrenia (Kuller, Ott,
Goisman, Wainwright, & Rabin, 2010), an intervention that targets the neurological
dysfunction associated with hallucinations and delusions. However, while these
psychotic symptoms respond well to this particular treatment, research discussed earlier
suggests thought disorder remains persistent and chronic. On the other hand, the research
discussed above suggests that lithium is the preferred treatment for mania, and
individuals in the aforementioned studies experienced remission in thought disorder
while receiving this particular treatment. While there is no direct discussion of the
impact of mood stabilizers or anti-depressant medication on thought disorder, the breadth
of research described above implicates, although indirectly, a relationship between affect
and thought disorder that may be extrapolated to schizophrenia. Differences in the course
of thought disorder in affective disorders, coupled with consideration of pharmacological
and psychotherapeutic interventions that may impact the remission of thought disorder in
affective groups suggests that affect may not only be implicated in the severity,
presentation, and chronicity of thought disorder in schizophrenia but is also a likely target
for treatment. Research further suggests that a history of affective symptoms is a good
prognostic indicator in psychiatric illness, generally (Keefe et al., 1987; Marengo &
Harrow, 1997). While this conclusion speaks to the remission of thought disorder in
affective disorders, this further suggests that more consideration must be given to affect
in schizophrenia to better understand if better prognosis is related to early intervention for
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significant affective symptoms and, if so, what this could mean for symptoms of
schizophrenia.
Review of Methodological Critiques
Course of Literature
While not explicitly discussed in the review thus far, it appears that, though
relevant and significant, much of the seminal research in thought disorder in
schizophrenia is over two decades old. This may be due to several factors: (1) more
current research uses different terms or conceptualizations of thought disorder (e.g.,
speech disorder or dysphasia); (2) thought disorder is an indicator of positive symptoms
and should therefore respond to interventions in the same fashion; (3) the endophenotypic
nature of thought disorder in schizophrenia contributes to less concern about symptom
remission and more concern about symptom management; and/or (4) there is an
uncertainty of where to go from here given the rich history of thought disorder, and the
myriad of formulations and the apparent absence of a consensus view. Furthermore, the
tendency to simply infer emotional experience from negative symptoms (i.e., negative
emotion or no emotion), an assertion that has been refuted (Kring et al., 1993; Malla,
1995), and the failure to appreciate the differences in experienced versus expressed
emotion have likely contributed to the difficulty in pursuing new perspectives such as the
one proposed in the current research.
Methodology
Measurement variability may have also created a challenge to pursuing a better
understanding of thought disorder. For example, extensive results from the CFS indicate
that limited or no responding suggests absence of thought disorder while the TLC asserts
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that this type of response is indicative of severe poverty of speech. Moreover, different
definitions of thought disorder across assessment procedures appear to represent
differences in conceptualization with the highest rating on the TLC being representative
of frequency and incomprehensibility of speech, compared to the highest rating on the
Thought Disorder Index (TDI; Johnston & Holzman, 1979; Johnston et al., 1986) and the
Thought and Language Index (TLI; Liddle et al., 2002) indicating a complete loss of
reality. The variability in these three areas has yet to be accounted for by previous
literature.
The use of RDC (Spitzer et al., 1978) versus DSM (American Psychiatric
Association, 1980; 1994; 2000) diagnostic criteria also presents a methodological
problem. As the more stringent of the two, RDC states that a diagnosis of schizophrenia
implies no affective disturbance at any time during the illness, with the presence of even
a brief episode earning a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder. This is quite different
from DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980), DSM-IV (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994), and DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria
that allow for a prominent affective disturbance in schizophrenia as long as it is brief.
Differences in the use of diagnostic criteria may result in a comparison of different
samples of schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder, limiting the ability for a consensus
view.
Another major criticism of the thought disorder literature, particularly as it relates
to the proposed moderating relationship of affect on the severity and presentation of
thought disorder in schizophrenia, is the limited acknowledgment and possible effects of
medication. Intragroup differences in medicated versus unmedicated states were
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addressed at times, but no differences between classes of medication were examined (i.e.,
antipsychotic medication versus mood stabilizer). This is particularly important given
that different types of medication target different physiological mechanisms, and that
failing to acknowledge the different interventions that comparison groups receive not
only presents a potential confound but also does not take into account the possible
benefits of treatment in one group (affective disorders and schizoaffective disorder) for a
shared mechanism that may impact thought processes across groups (i.e., affect).
Research Samples
The samples utilized in the aforementioned studies are also somewhat
problematic. The heterogeneous samples used in many of the CFS studies (i.e. PNS, NP)
control for psychosis but do not acknowledge the affective components likely at play
given the composition of the samples, particularly with regard to valence and intensity of
affect and differences in pharmacological treatments. Moreover, detailed examination of
schizoaffective disorder has the potential to be very useful. However, schizoaffective
disorder was only examined individually in three of the studies reviewed and in others
was included within the PNS grouping in the CFS project (see Table 3), or not discussed.
While the exclusion of schizoaffective disorder in these procedures allows for a clean
examination of thought disorder in schizophrenia and affective groups, it reflects an
implicit disregard for the continuum of affective impairment that links these three
diagnostic groups. Finally, the samples described are primarily inpatient samples so they
are not representative of the respective diagnoses and limit the generalizability to
individuals in other stages of the illness.
Conclusions and Hypotheses
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Affect may contribute to the severity and presentation of acute thought disorder
and may be implicated in the persistence of thought disorder in schizophrenia, a
conceptualization similarly proposed by Andreasen in her early attempts to quantify
thought disorder (1979b). Findings from the affect and cognition literature support a
relationship between affective intensity and valence, and manifestation of thought
disorder. Following from findings illustrating that positive affect contributes to broad,
top-down processing and negative affect leads to narrow, bottom-up processing, it is
hypothesized that positive affect will contribute to thought disorder elements indicative
of broad, but loose cognitions, and negative affect will contribute to narrow, restricted
responding. It can also be hypothesized that affective intensity would impact thought
disorder in schizophrenia in a fashion similar to the widespread impact that intense
affective experiences have on all individuals from normal to those suffering from severe
psychopathology: significant, pervasive disruption and worsening of symptoms in a
variety of domains.
Current Hypotheses
While the study of thought disorder in schizophrenia has seen decades of
research, we have only limited knowledge about the factors that contribute to the
heterogeneous severity and presentation of this impairment. The earlier review suggests
that affect may play a significant role in thought disorder in schizophrenia and
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders (e.g. schizoaffective disorder). However, there is
limited research in the area of baseline affective experience, and affect and thought
disorder, leaving only speculations about this relationship. Therefore, the study of the
relationship between thought disorder and affect in schizophrenia requires examination of
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the most basic questions related to affective intensity and valence, and thought disorder
severity. While significant questions also remain regarding assessment and
understanding of affective experience in schizophrenia, the current research seeks to
examine thought disorder and the role that affect may play, and not affective experience
per se.
Hypothesis 1. While affect intensity and valence are both thought to contribute to
the severity of thought disorder, it is hypothesized that affect intensity is a more
significant factor in the severity of thought disorder in schizophrenia and schizoaffective
disorder. Affect intensity has shown to be related to impairment in a variety of cognitive
processes across individuals and affective valence (Basso, Shefft, & Hoffmann, 1994;
Larsen & Diener, 1987). Two hypotheses will be tested to address this larger hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1a. Self-reported global affect intensity (positive and negative items
combined) as measured by the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson,
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) will be predictive of thought disorder severity as measured by
the TDI total score.
Hypothesis 1b. Positive and negative valence components of the PANAS will
differentially contribute to thought disorder severity (TDI total score). It is hypothesized
that the intensity of positive affect will account for more variance in thought disorder
severity than negative affect. This hypothesis follows research that suggests that positive
affect, when coupled with high affective intensity, may impair cognitive processes
(Basso, Shefft, & Hoffman, 1994).
Hypothesis 2. Self-reported intensity of positive and negative affect as measured
by the PANAS will differentially relate to response categories from the TDI.

	
  

38

	
  
Specifically, positive affect will be related to categories that reflect broader, more
associative processing, while negative affect will be related to categories that reflect
narrowed processing. See Table 4 for definitions of the response categories for each
severity level on the TDI. This hypothesis seeks to explore robust findings from the
literature regarding the relationship between positive affect and broad, top-down
processing, and negative affect and narrow, bottom-up processing (Bar, 2009; Clore &
Palmer, 2009; Fredrickson, 2001), albeit at the more extreme and impaired end of an
implied continuum. Two hypotheses will be tested to address this broader hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2a. Positive and negative affect as measured by the PANAS will be
related to exemplars of broad versus narrow processing from the TDI. Sixteen categories
were chosen to explore this hypothesis; nine were selected for positive affect and seven
for negative affect.
Hypothesis 2b. Using all of the response categories from the TDI, significant
factors will be identified using exploratory factor analyses that reflect broad versus
narrow processing. These factors will be significantly related to positive and negative
affect as measured by the PANAS.

	
  

39

	
  

METHODS

Sample
Individuals eligible to participate in the study met the following inclusion criteria:
(1) Axis I diagnosis of schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder as indicated from the
patient chart; (2) currently residing in an acute inpatient hospital; (3) native English
speaker; and (4) able to provide informed consent. Patients were excluded if they had:
(1) an Axis I diagnosis of delirium, or Alzheimer’s or Vascular dementia; (2) an Axis II
diagnosis of mental retardation; (3) an Axis III diagnosis of traumatic brain injury; (4)
other known medical, neurological, or cognitive conditions that are suspected of
significantly affecting thinking, behavior, or one’s ability to complete study measures;
and (5) hearing or visual impairments without corrective treatment. Because this study
was formulated as an examination of thought disorder and affect within schizophrenia
and schizoaffective disorder and not a study of diagnosis, no control group was used.
Measures
Individuals who agreed to participate and from whom consent was obtained
completed the following self-report measures: sociodemographic form and Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). Participants were also administered the Rorschach
Inkblot Test and responses to each of the 10 stimulus cards were used to assess thought
disorder severity using the TDI.
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Sociodemographic form. The following sociodemographic data was identified
through thorough review of the medical chart and confirmed by the patient, with the
understanding that information from the medical chart was determined as the most
accurate in light of any discrepancies given the extensive medical and psychiatric
information obtained by the unit social workers:
1. Age
2. Sex
3. Ethnicity
4. Race
5. Diagnosis
6. Marital Status
7. Educational attainment
8. Employment status
9. Employment history
10. Current living status
11. Current medications
12. Medication adherence
13. Medical history
14. Number of previous hospitalizations
15. Other current treatment
16. Age of first hospitalizations
17. Age of first episode
18. Duration of illness (current age – age at first hospitalization)
19. Family psychiatric history
20. Substance abuse history
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. The Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) is 20-item self-report measure of
positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA). Ten exemplars each of positive and
negative affect are rated on a 5-point likert scale: 1 (very slightly or not at all) – 5 (very
much). Indices of PA include attentive, interested, alert, excited, enthusiastic, inspired,
proud, determined, strong, and active. Indices of NA include 2 items across five
categories: (a) distress (distressed, upset), (b) angry (hostile, irritable), (c) fearful (scared,
afraid), (d) guilty (ashamed, guilty), and (e) jittery (nervous, jittery). Participants are
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asked to rate “ to what extent” they have experienced each exemplar for a given span of
time determined a priori by the examiner (e.g. “you feel this way right now, at the present
moment,” “you have felt this way today,” “you have felt this way during the past week,”
“you generally feel this way, that is, how you feel on the average”). The current study
asked participants to rate their experience of each of the 20 items “at the present
moment.” This time instruction was determined most appropriate given research
regarding the difficulty of individuals with schizophrenia in identifying emotional states
or experiences retrospectively or following even a short delay (Gold, 2011; Ursu et al.,
2011). Furthermore, it is expected that affect at the time of thought disorder assessment
is the most likely to be related to TDI. A completed PANAS provides a global intensity
score determined by the summed ratings across all 20 exemplars (range of 20-100), and
an intensity score for PA and NA (range of 10 – 50, respectively).
The ten exemplars of positive and negative affect included in this measure were
identified through principle components analysis of 60-items identified by Zevon &
Tellegen (1982). Watson et al. (1988) determined items as exemplars of positive or
negative affect with loadings of .40 or higher on the relevant factor and <0.25 on the
other factor. The PANAS has shown strong reliability in healthy adults with intraclass
correlations for PA ranging from .86 - .90 and .84 - .87 for NA, and in a psychiatric
inpatient sample with correlations of .85 and .91 for PA and NA, respectively (Watson et
al., 1988). The correlation across scales is low for both samples with -.12 - -.23 for the
healthy sample and -.27 for the psychiatric sample, suggesting independent scales. These
reliability estimates have been shown to be unrelated to the time instructions used (“this
moment;” “today;” “past few days;” “week;” “past few weeks;” “year;” “general, on
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average”). Test-retest reliability data in healthy individuals shows stability across
administrations as well as increased stability over longer time frames (i.e. “today” versus
“over the last year”) (Watson et al., 1988). Construct validity analyses revealed that PA
is negatively correlated across time frames with measures of distress and dysfunction,
depression, and responses to stressful and aversive events, with scores ranging from -.19 -.36. Conversely, NA was positively correlated with all of the aforementioned measures
with scores ranging from .51 - .74 (Watson et al., 1988).
Thought Disorder Index (TDI). The Thought Disorder Index (TDI, Johnston &
Holzman, 1979; Johnson et al., 1986) is used to identify and rate the severity of thinking
disturbances. Using verbatim responses from the Rorschach Inkblot Test (Rorschach,
1942), the TDI assesses thought disorder on a scale of severity from 0.25 (minor
idiosyncrasies) – 1.0 (complete loss of reality). For use with the TDI, the Rorschach is
administered using Rapaport instructions (Rapaport, Gill, & Schafer, 1968), which allows
for inquiry after each card rather than after all ten cards have been shown as is required in
other scoring systems (e.g. Exner scoring system, Exner, 1993). While the TDI may be
used with any assessment that provides a verbal sample such as the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale (WAIS, Wechsler, 2008) or a semi-structured clinical interview, the
Rorschach offers many advantages over alternative tests given the novelty of the task and
its unstructured format. The design of the Rorschach allows for greater likelihood of
thought disorder when compared to other assessments that are comprised of standardized
questions that likely result in stereotypic responses (Holzman et al., 2005). Furthermore,
research has also shown that the TDI, when used with the Rorschach, is a valid indicator
of thought disorder in schizophrenia and shows significant incremental validity in
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predicting future psychotic symptoms when added to a clinical interview (Lilienfeld,
Wood, & Garb, 2000).
A score of 0.25 (minor idiosyncrasies) is given for responses that would be only
rarely noticed in normal conversation but would likely become increasingly unclear
following an accumulation of such responses. A score of 0.5 (distinct oddness) is given
for responses that reflect an idiosyncratic and odd response style, albeit not bizarre.
These responses may occur with moderate frequency in normal conversation but would
be unlikely to suggest loss of contact with reality. A score of 0.75 is given for responses
that clearly illustrate disordered thought. Exemplars of this level reflect instability in
thinking and perceiving, and bizarre, absurd responses. At the 1.0 level, responses are
significantly disordered and appear to reflect a complete loss of contact with reality.
Within each level of severity are categories of characteristic responses that allow for both
qualitative and quantitative information. See Table 4 for response categories for each
level of severity and definitions of each category. Severity of thought disorder as
indicated by total TDI score is calculated using the following equation,
Σ[0.25(A) + 0.50(B) + 0.75(C) + 1.0(D)] x 100
Total R
where A is the number of responses at the 0.25 level, B is the number of responses at the
0.50 level, C is the number of responses at the 0.75 level, D is the number of responses at
the 1.0 level, and R is the total number of Rorschach responses. A total TDI score is
derived by the sum of each instance of thought disorder weighted by its severity level and
divided by the number of total responses to control for verbal production. This value is
then multiplied by 100 and expressed as a percentage of thought disorder severity.
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For each stimulus card from the Rorschach, a score is given for each response
where it appears thought disorder is exhibited. In addition, only one score is given per
individual response within a stimulus card and the score is chosen based on that which
best captures the process that appears evident in the response. A scored protocol
provides the frequency of responses for each exemplar, number of responses at each level
of severity, the number of responses for each category, and a thought disorder severity
total score (Johnston et al., 1986).
Everyone involved in the administration and scoring of the TDI in the current
study has completed extensive training followed by regular follow-up meetings to
maintain skills. For the current administration, all responses were tape-recorded and then
transcribed for scoring purposes. Transcribed responses were retained, de-identified, for
later analysis. Each completed protocol was scored by a group of at least three trained
researchers.
The use of the Rorschach with the TDI for measuring thought disorder has shown
good internal consistency using the Spearman-Brown formula with a value of .78
(Johnston & Holzman, 1979). In addition, reliability analyses have shown strong interrater reliability for individual and group raters across varying levels of psychopathology.
Johnston and Holzman (1979) found strong inter-rater reliability for TDI total score with
two independent raters for a sample of individuals with schizophrenia (r = .90),
nonpsychotic patients (r = .93) and nonpsychiatric controls (r = .82). Similarly, Solovay,
Shenton, and Holzman (1987) examined a sample of individuals with schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder and healthy controls, and showed strong inter-rater reliability using the
Spearman-Brown formula for two independent raters for TDI total score (r = .89),
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severity level (r = .79), and categories (r = .81). Coleman et al. (1993) used four
independent teams of raters to examine thought disorder severity in a sample of
individuals with schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, or bipolar disorder, as well as
first-degree relatives of these patients. Coleman et al. (1993) found strong inter-rater
reliability for TDI total scores ranging from rs = .80 to .90. Furthermore, Coleman et al.
(1993) showed intraclass correlations of .77, .72, and .77 for levels 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75,
respectively (there were not enough responses at the 1.0 level to calculate reliability), and
intraclass correlations of .58, .76, and .86 for idiosyncratic verbalizations, combinatory
thinking, and irrelevant intrusions, respectively (these were the only categories for which
there were enough instances to calculate reliability).
Developers of the TDI determined that a valid measure of thought disorder should
distinguish between individuals with schizophrenia, acutely disturbed nonpsychotic
individuals, and healthy controls (Johnston & Holzman, 1979). Research using the TDI
with the Rorschach has shown that the TDI can distinguish schizophrenia and bipolar
disorder in adolescent and adult samples using principal component factor analytic
procedures (Makowski et al., 1997; Solovay et al., 1987), and is an effective tool for
identifying other disorders on the schizophrenia spectrum such as schizoaffective
disorder and schizotypy (Coleman, Levy, Lenzenweger, & Holzman, 1996; Holzman et
al., 1995).
Procedures
Recruitment. The current project was approved by the director of nursing on the
inpatient unit at the University of Louisville Hospital, as well as the University of
Louisville and the University of Louisville Hospital Institutional Review Board.
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Information was provided to all staff on the inpatient unit to describe the purpose and
procedures of the study, as well as any assistance from the staff that might have been
necessary. All recruitment took place on the unit. Participants were first identified for
eligibility by reviewing diagnoses relevant to the inclusion and exclusion criteria, and
confirming their ability to participate with the unit nurse; permission for this information
was obtained through a partial waiver approved by the University of Louisville Hospital
Institutional Review Board. Potential participants were approached to inquire about their
interest in participating in the current study.
Individuals identified as being eligible for the study were given pertinent study
information, including why the study was being conducted, and risks, benefits,
confidentiality, and payment. Following that, individuals were told the following: “If
you choose to participate in this study I will be asking you to answer some questions
about yourself and how you are currently feeling. I will also ask you to answer questions
about a set of pictures.” Individuals were informed that their verbal responses would be
tape-recorded for transcription and that responses would be retained, de-identified, for
later analyses. Finally, individuals were told that all data would be coded with a
participant identification number that will be secured separately with each participant’s
identifying information (i.e. name, age, race, and date of birth). Participants had the
opportunity to ask any additional questions and were given the option to proceed through
the informed consent process, consider participating with the option to proceed with
informed consent and participation at a later time, or decline participation altogether.
Because the average length of stay on this particular unit is six days, all attempts were
made to conduct testing on the day interested patients provided consent to do so. For
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participants who requested a break or who were interrupted by a unit activity, testing was
completed within 24 hours of the stopping point.
Informed consent. Individuals who expressed interest in study participation
were introduced to the informed consent process. Each individual who provided consent
was assessed for understanding of the consenting process and the requirements of
participation. The following questions were required to be answered such that an
adequate level of understanding was observed: (a) “What are you being asked to do as a
participant in this project;” (b) “Who should you ask if you have questions about any part
of the project;” (c) “What would you do if you were experiencing distress or discomfort
during the study;” and (d) “Do you have to participate?”
After consent was obtained, each participant was briefed about the hospital
HIPAA policy and asked to sign a form indicating their understanding of the policy and
how their protected health information may be used. Following signing the HIPAA form,
the participant’s medical chart was reviewed to further determine eligibility.
Completion of measures. Administration of screening and assessment
instruments is standard procedure on most inpatient psychiatric units, including
University of Louisville Hospital. Therefore, it was not expected that completion of the
measures for the current study would cause significant disruption for patients or staff, or
the daily routine of the milieu. Moreover, screening and assessment done currently on
this unit is usually not considered invasive or above minimal risk by patients or staff.
A majority of the socio-demographic information was obtained from the patient.
Additional information was obtained and/or corroborated from the patient’s chart, as
needed. Following consent for participation and completing the socio-demographic
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questionnaire, each participant was administered the Rorschach and asked to fill out the
PANAS. Patients with reading difficulties had the PANAS read to them. The order of
administration of these assessments was counterbalanced across participants to control
for any order effects. Following the administration of all measures, participants were
engaged in a short, neutral conversation to provide a distraction from any distress that
may have been caused by the study items. The average length of time for completion
was approximately 1.5 hours.
Data Analyses
Descriptive analyses. Descriptive analyses were completed for all variables
using IBM SPSS Statistics 20. Correlation analyses were conducted for the following
socio-demographic variables, and PANAS scores and the TDI total score to explore
statistically significant relationships: age, days in the hospital, years of education, age at
first psychiatric episode, age at first hospitalization, number of hospitalizations, and
duration of illness. Other socio-demographic variables were not analyzed due to large
sample size discrepancies across variable categories.
Hypothesis 1a.
Simple regression analysis. Simple regression analysis was used to examine the
relation between affect intensity from the PANAS and total thought disorder score from
the TDI. Global intensity level was summed across all 20 PA and NA exemplars from
the PANAS, yielding a range of 20-100. Significant findings were determined using α =
.05.
Hypothesis 1b.
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Multiple regression analysis. Multiple regression analysis was conducted to
examine the variance in TDI total scores explained by intensity of positive and negative
affect from the PANAS. PA and NA were determined by summing the intensity ratings
for the 10 exemplars for PA and NA, respectively. To make the component ranges
comparable to the global intensity range, each summed component score was multiplied
by two, yielding a possible range of scores from 20-100. Pearson’s correlation analysis
was used to check for multicollinearity. A correlation of r < .80 was used as the cut-off
for determining the appropriateness of using a pair of variables as independent predictors
in the multiple regression analysis in accordance with recommendations by Field (2009)
as well a collinearity diagnostics from the regression analyses. The total TDI score was
the criterion variable. Both the overall model and the fit of each predictor were explored.
The forced-entry method was used to evaluate the relative significance of intensity of
positive affect and intensity of negative affect. This method was chosen over other
methods, as it is most appropriate for theory testing and less influenced by random
variation that could impact the replicability of findings (Field, 2009).
Hypothesis 2a.
Correlation analysis. Pearson’s correlation analysis was used to examine the
relation of indices of PA and NA from the PANAS with instances of broad versus narrow
cognitive processing from the TDI to further explore the association between affect and
cognitive processing hypothesized in the literature (Bar, 2009; Clore & Palmer, 2009;
Fredrickson, 2001). The PA and NA variables were determined by the sum of the ratings
across each of the 10 exemplars, respectively. Cognitive processing was examined with
response categories from the TDI that are characteristic of broad versus narrow
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processing. Exemplars from the 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 severity levels that demonstrate
broad and narrow processing were chosen a priori based on extensive descriptions from
Johnston and Holzman (1979) and Holzman et al. (2005). The response categories for
broad processing included clang, relationship verbalization, idiosyncratic symbolism,
looseness, fabulized combinations, playful confabulations, fluidity, confabulations, and
flippancy. Narrow processing was explored using inappropriate distance, vagueness,
word-finding difficulties, perseveration, incongruous combinations, fragmentation, and
autistic logic. Categories not used in this analysis are thought to show greater variability
in processing and could theoretically reflect broad or narrow processing depending on the
response. No categories were chosen from the 1.0 level due to the infrequency of
response types at that level. The TDI scores for each exemplar used in the correlation
analysis reflect a proportion, determined by the frequency of the exemplar divided by the
total number of responses (R) for each individual. Significant relationships were
determined using α = .05.
Hypothesis 2b.
Exploratory factor analysis. In addition to examining the relation between affect
and cognitive processing using a set of exemplars determined a priori, an exploratory
factor analysis (EFA) was hypothesized to quantitatively determine if response categories
from the TDI load on a set of factors that reflect broad versus narrow cognitive
processing that may, in turn, be related to PA and NA. However, the data collected did
not allow this analysis to be conducted. See Results section for continued explanation.
Participant Sample and Statistical Power
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G*Power 3.1 (Erdfelder, Faul, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) was used to calculate the
sample size necessary to conduct the proposed analyses. Standard Cohen’s d effect sizes
were used to calculate power analyses given the wide range of effect sizes seen in the
literature (i.e. Cohen & Minor, 2010). Given an alpha level = .05, estimated power = .80,
two predictors, and a standard medium effect size of f2 = .15, the estimated sample size
necessary for multiple regression analysis is 68 participants. This estimation is more
stringent than the rule of thumb described by Field (2009) that suggests 10-15 cases for
each predictor, which in this case would recommend 20-30 participants. To examine
correlation analyses, G*Power suggests a sample of 84 participants when using an alpha
level = .05, estimated power = .80, and a medium effect size of r = .30.
While Field (2009) describes rules of thumb for estimating sample size when
using EFA such as 10-15 participants per variable, or 5-10 participants per variable up to
a total of 300, research has shown it is ultimately the factor loadings that are of the
utmost importance when establishing the fit of a particular model (Field, 2009; Winter,
Dodou, & Wieringa, 2009). Winter et al. (2009) reported that lower sample sizes are
satisfactory when factor loadings and the number of variables are high, and when the
number of factors is small. For example, a model specifying factor loadings of .4, two
factors, and 24 variables estimated a sample size of 134, compared to a model specifying
factor loadings of .6, two factors, and 24 variables that estimated a sample size of 34.
Given the difficulty recruiting clinical samples and the variability in the patient sample
on the inpatient unit at any given time (potentially limiting recruitment of individual with
schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder), more stringent guidelines will be used for
factor loadings, allowing for a smaller sample.
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Taken together, a sample range of 20-84 participants was deemed acceptable to
address the aforementioned hypotheses and associated analyses. The elimination of the
EFA from the current study did not change the estimated sample size needed. This range
represents the floor and ceiling of the sample size estimation, with anything lower than
20 yielding questionable power and anything above 84 unlikely to add additional power.
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RESULTS

Descriptive Analyses
The current sample is comprised of twenty-four inpatients with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder . See Table 5 for descriptive sample
information. Table 6 includes the mean, standard deviation, and range information for
the criterion and predictor variables: PANAS total score, PANAS NA, PANAS, PA, and
total TDI score. The mean total TDI score for the current sample was comparable to
other studies reviewed, albeit somewhat higher (M = 40.62, SD = 35.85). In a sample of
inpatients and outpatients with functional psychosis, bipolar disorder, personality
disorder, and first-degree relatives with psychosis, mean TDI total scores were 24.05 (SD
= 28.74) for one sample and 22.56 (SD = 27.38) for another (Carpenter et al., 1993).
Coleman et al. (1993) examined twenty protocols from a sample of inpatients with
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and bipolar disorder. Four separate rating teams
found mean TDI total scores of 35.25 (SD = 50.20), 22.78 (SD = 30.06), 37.92 (SD =
47.29), and 18.79 (SD = 29.15), respectively. Holzman et al. (1986) found a mean TDI
score of 34.60 (SD = 38.80) for a sample of inpatients with schizophrenia and 22.80 (SD
= 21.40) for schizoaffective disorder. The range presented in Table 6 is also comparable
to and falls within the ranges found by four different scoring groups in Coleman et al.
(1993).
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The following variables from the socio-demographic form were analyzed for their
relations with the predictor and criterion variables: age, days in the hospital, years of
education, age at first psychiatric episode, age at first hospitalization, number of
hospitalizations, and duration of illness. Other socio-demographic variables were not
analyzed due to large sample size discrepancies across variable categories. Spearman’s
correlations were used for this analysis due to non-normal distributions of all the
aforementioned socio-demographic variables. See Table 7 for the correlation coefficients
for the PANAS and TDI variables, and each of the socio-demographic variables, as well
correlation coefficients across the socio-demographic variables. There were no
significant correlations between any of the socio-demographic variables and PANAS and
TDI scores. Age at the time of testing was positively correlated with age at first
psychotic episode, age at first hospitalization, and duration of illness. Age at first
psychiatric episode was positively related to age at first hospitalization.
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1a. Pearson correlation analyses were conducted for the PANAS total
score and the total TDI score; affective intensity as measured by the PANAS total score
was positively correlated with thought disorder severity as measured by the total TDI
score (see Table 8). Simple regression analysis was conducted to examine the hypothesis
that affective intensity predicts thought disorder severity. PANAS total score was a
significant predictor of TDI total score and accounted for 40% of the variance in thought
disorder severity, R = .408, F(1,23) = 4.39, p < .05.
Hypothesis 1b. Pearson correlation analyses were conducted for the PANAS PA
and PANAS NA scores and the total TDI score to examine the differential contribution of
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positive and negative affect in thought disorder severity. No multicollinearity was
demonstrated between PA and NA, r = -.074. Neither positive nor negative affect was
significantly associated with thought disorder severity (see Table 8). While a
conventional significance level was approached, multiple regression analysis examining
positive and negative affect as predictors of thought disorder severity was not significant,
R = .412, F(1,23) = 2.14, p = .142.
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2a. Pearson correlation analysis was conducted for PANAS PA and
PANAS NA, and exemplars of broad, associative processing and narrow processing,
respectively. The following exemplars were chosen a priori as indicators of broad,
associative processing: clang, relationship verbalization, idiosyncratic symbolism,
looseness, fabulized combinations, playful confabulations, fluidity, confabulations, and
flippancy. There was a significant negative correlation for positive affect and fabulized
combinations (see Table 9). The following exemplars were chosen a priori as indicators
of narrow processing: inappropriate distance, vagueness, word-finding difficulties,
perseveration, incongruous combinations, fragmentation, and autistic logic. There was a
significant positive correlation for negative affect and autistic logic (see Table 10).
Pearson correlations were also examined for PANAS NA and fabulized
combinations, and PANAS PA and autistic logic to explore discriminant validity. The
correlation coefficients were non-significant.
Hypothesis 2b. EFA was not conducted due to low frequencies across the
majority of TDI factors. An EFA analysis would have been driven by the item
frequencies and not by theory and the hypothesized relationships.
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DISCUSSION

Findings
Hypothesis 1. Affective intensity was a better predictor of thought disorder
severity and a more salient predictor of the severity of thought disorder than affective
valence. This offers some support to work examining the impact of affective intensity,
across valence, on a variety of cognitive processes. As reported earlier, Basso et al.
(1994) showed that affective intensity moderates the relationship between affective
valence and cognition, specifically word recognition. It was found that low self-reported
affective intensity coupled with positive mood was related to better word recognition in a
sample of college women, and high self-reported intensity coupled with negative mood
was related to better word recognition in the same sample. Unlike Basso et al. (1993),
the current results did not explore nor demonstrate an intensity by valence interaction for
a measure of cognitive dysfunction, but instead hypothesized the significance of affective
intensity over and above valence. However, taken together with the earlier literature, it is
posited that affective intensity may contribute to a more disorganized thought process by
disrupting one’s ability to recruit associated networks and filter out unnecessary data. In
turn, this impacts the use of effective processing strategies and integration associated
information in a way that allows for coherent expression.
Hypothesis 1b was not supported; positive affect did not account for more
variance in thought disorder severity than negative affect. Conversely, negative affect
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demonstrated a trend toward significance, t(22) = 1.77, p = .092. This suggests that selfreported NA may be more salient to thought disorder severity in this population than PA.
It is unclear why NA emerged as a more relevant factor. Ratings of NA intensity were
lower (M = 38.50) than those of PA intensity (M = 67.83), which suggests that the current
sample was experiencing more PA than NA, overall. However, the current findings
support earlier work in this area that has shown a relationship between NA and measures
of neuropsychological dysfunction (Halari et al., 2006), and communication disturbance
from the CDI (Burbridge & Barch, 2002; Docherty et al., 1994a; Docherty et al., 1997;
Docherty et al., 1994b). Taken together, this may reflect that the narrow, bottom-up
processing associated with NA is more disruptive, because it impairs the ability to
develop an organized expression of thought. Impairment in the development of a
coherent idea may be more detrimental than the inability to filter our expansive and
overly inclusive information that was hypothesized.
Hypothesis 2. Results from the current study are also consistent with the relation
between affective valence and cognitive processing reported in the literature. The
significant relationship between NA and autistic logic supports the association between
negative affect and bottom-up, narrow processing seen in the literature. Holzman et al.
(2005) define autistic logic as “the respondent justifies a statement by rationalizing it
with a ‘because’ statement that is illogical or based on private autistic reasoning
processes rather than conventional, logical reasoning,” p. 70. This definition describes an
extremely narrow processing style that not only ignores or inhibits use of associated
networks, but also fails to filter out irrelevant information. This reflects a pathological
“bottom-up” processing strategy in that the initial response details used to develop a
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representation are illogically related. While one might question whether the “private
autistic reasoning” mentioned above includes attempts at recruitment of associated
networks, albeit even loosely or tangentially, the inherent nature of autistic logic is a
response style in which two parts (the statement and its rationalization) are not related by
any logical or relational thread. Overall, autistic logic appears to be very similar to the
narrow processing strategy posited to stem from NA that is discussed in the affect and
cognition literature.
While the relationship between NA and autistic logic occurred in the expected
direction, the significant correlation for PA and fabulized combinations did not.
Examination of PA and exemplars of broad, associative processing demonstrated a
significant, negative association for PA and fabulized combinations. While PA is often
associated with more effective use of associated networks (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999;
Bar, 2009; Clore & Palmer, 2009; Fredrickson, 2001) and therefore more effective
cognitive processing, it was hypothesized that PA would be related to an associative
process that was over-inclusive and too broad in schizophrenia and schizoaffective
disorder, and related to disordered thought. However, the current findings suggest that
PA is associated with decreased frequency of fabulized combinations in this sample.
While this was the only significant relationship, this suggests that despite
psychopathology, the positive influence of PA stands and may be protective in some way.
Although it is not debated that cognitive decline is a prevalent feature of schizophrenia
and schizoaffective disorder, the presence of PA may have facilitated the patients’ use of
some preserved premorbid cognitive networks. Fabulized combinations are characterized
by forcing two contiguous percepts into a relationship that violates reality. In the current
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sample, this dysfunctional process may have been disrupted through an ability to access
some more reality-based networks. However, review of the direction of the other
correlation coefficients does not fully support this pattern and further study is necessary
to fully explore this relationship.
Post hoc analyses were conducted to further understand the relationship between
affective valence and thought disorder. Mean PA and NA group differences were
explored for the presence versus absence of each exemplar. Of the 24 exemplars,
independent samples t-tests could only be conducted on nine of the exemplars due to very
low or zero frequencies (see Table 11). A significant mean group difference was found
for level of PA and presence of vagueness; individuals who exhibited vagueness
demonstrated higher self-reported PA (M = 78.57, n = 7) than those who did not exhibit
vagueness (M = 68.41, n = 17). Significant mean group differences were found for selfreported NA and confabulations, incoherence, and absurd responses. Those who
demonstrated confabulations reported higher levels of NA (M = 45.73, n = 15) than those
without any confabulated responses (M = 26.44, n = 9). Individuals who exhibited
incoherent responses reported higher NA (M = 52.00, n = 6) than those who did not (M =
34.00, n = 18), and individuals who did not exhibit any absurd responses on the
Rorschach exhibited higher self-reported NA (M = 39.91, n = 22) than those who
demonstrated absurd thinking (M = 23.00, n = 2).
While the a priori and post hoc analyses described above support a relationship
between affective valence and cognitive processing, the nature of the association is
unclear from the current data and needs further study. PA appeared to demonstrate some
protective features in a priori analyses, but was later associated with the presence of
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vague responding in post hoc analyses. Moreover, vagueness was initially hypothesized
to represent a narrow, bottom-up processing due to the use of very limited information
and details used to create a response. The relationship between PA and the presence of
vagueness may represent the protective nature of PA described earlier; access to
preserved premorbid reality based cognitive networks may have prevented more severe
and unrealistic responses, but did not facilitate the development of a more detailed
response. Similarly, confabulated responses were hypothesized to be related to PA,
however post hoc analyses demonstrated a relationship with NA. In hindsight, the
confabulatory process may reflect a bottom-up process. A confabulated response is
characterized by extreme elaboration of a percept that extends past the bounds of reality.
Therefore, one focuses on details that later develop into an elaborate, unrealistic
representation. Interestingly, the correlation between NA and confabulations
demonstrated a trend toward significance, r = .369, p = .076.
Neither incoherence nor absurd responses were included in the a priori analyses
for hypothesis 2a due to their level of disorganization and the difficulty understanding
any form or source of the response by the examiner. While, it is unclear, why NA was
related to the presence or absence of such a disorganized response style, perhaps both
NA, and incoherence and absurd responses reflect severity of schizophrenia accounted
for by some other process(es) not examined in the dissertation.
The exploratory factor analysis (EFA) that was initially suggested was unable to
be conducted due to low frequency of many of the exemplars. Because all exemplars
from the TDI were to be used in the EFA, those with a frequency of zero would introduce
a confound in the analysis. The analysis itself would no longer be theory-driven, but
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instead driven by the presence of the exemplars that demonstrated a frequency greater
than zero in this sample. Therefore, the EFA was not conducted but should be
reconsidered with a larger sample to explore the relationship between PA and NA and
indicators of broad, top-down processing versus narrow, bottom-up processing,
respectively, obtained in this sample. While there are different rules of thumb for
identifying a sufficient sample size for EFA (Field, 2009; Winter et al., 2009) it is
difficult to project a necessary sample size to conduct the hypothesized EFA for the
current study. A large sample size will not necessarily increase the frequency of all
exemplars and might elicit a set of exemplars that are most popular. It could make sense
to conduct an EFA based on the most popular exemplars, per previous studies. However,
of the most rare exemplars identified by D. L. Levy (personal communication, January
19, 2013) (flippancy, vague, word-finding difficulty, relationship verbalization,
fragmentation, neologisms), only relationship verbalization and neologisms were not in
the present sample, suggesting that the frequency of some exemplars may be based on the
composition of a particular sample or biases of a particular research group. While the
TDI is an empirically supported assessment of thought disorder in schizophrenia, the
process itself is somewhat subjective, and scores are based on discussion and consensus
of a scoring group, as was done in the current study.
Limitations
Sample. The current study has some limitations that impact the generalizability of
the findings. First, the sample size was somewhat small. For example, significant results
from two of the a priori and post hoc analyses using exemplars from the TDI included
only n =1 (hypothesis 2a = autistic logic) or n = 2 (post hoc analysis = presence of absurd
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responses). Although the sample size exceeded the lower end of the sample necessary for
the proposed analyses, a larger sample is necessary to broaden the frequency and type of
thought disorder exemplars, replicate findings in this sample and increase the power of
the analyses.
Second, the current sample was an inpatient sample from an acute psychiatric unit
that primarily serves an indigent population. The sample likely differs in a number of
ways from other inpatient and outpatient samples. Individuals in the current sample are
more likely to come from a more disadvantaged background than individuals who may be
inpatients at other hospitals in the area. Moreover, one might assert that individuals in
the current sample may have had access to fewer resources throughout the course of their
illness than individuals who are inpatients in other psychiatric settings within the study
area, which may impact the severity of their current symptoms and overall deterioration.
Paradoxically, some authors have found that higher social class is related to increased
thought disorder severity using the TDI (Arboleda & Holzman, 1985; Haimo & Holzman,
1979). While level of education was the only measure of SES or social class included in
the current study, there were no significant relationships between education level and
TDI scores. The level of education in the current sample (M = 12.13) is comparable to
education levels reported in other studies using the TDI (Mschizophrenia = 12.70,
Mschizoaffective = 13.70, Holzman et al., 1986; Msample 1 = 13.80, Msample 2 = 13.61; Carpenter
et al., 1993).
The point was argued earlier in this dissertation about the relevance of medication
for understanding previous work examining the relationship between affect and thought
disorder and differences between schizophrenia and affective groups. For the current
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study, all individuals were on at least one antipsychotic medication. Nine individuals
were on antipsychotics alone, and fifteen individuals were on antipsychotics plus some
medication for affective disturbance. Of the latter group of individuals, eight were on an
antipsychotic plus a mood stabilizer, four were on an antipsychotic plus an
antidepressant, and three individuals were on all three medication types. There were no
significant mean differences in thought disorder severity between those who were on
antipsychotics only (M = 55.30) and those on antipsychotics plus an antidepressant (M =
20.86), antipsychotics plus a mood stabilizer (M = 41.31), or those taking antipsychotics,
an antidepressant, and a mood stabilizer (M = 21.14), F(3,20) = 1.24, p = .321. When the
sample was dichotomized into those receiving only antipsychotics (M = 55.30) and those
receiving some combination of antipsychotics and medication for mood (M = 31.82), the
results remained nonsignificant, F(1,22) = 2.58, p = .123. Lack of significant differences
may be due to combination of small sample and large variance.
A similar comparison was done for medication and PANAS scores. There were
no significant mean differences for the four medication groups and PANAS total score,
F(3,20) = 1.23, p = .325, NA, F(3,20) = 1.07, p = .386, or PA, F(3,20) = 2.12, p = .129.
The dichotomized medication groups also did not yield significant mean differences for
PANAS total score, F(1,22) = .116, p = .736, NA, F(1,22) = .955, p = .339, or PA,
F(1,22) = 2.77, p = .110.
Given the acuity of symptoms and the circumstances of an inpatient admission,
this sample is also likely to be quite different from an outpatient sample of individuals
with schizophrenia on concurrent measures of thought disorder and affective intensity
and valence. It is expected that the current sample exhibited more severe symptoms than
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would be seen in an outpatient sample, therefore the current findings should not be
generalized to an outpatient population. While the persistence of thought disorder
symptoms despite antipsychotic medication has been described here, it is likely that the
current inpatient sample was more symptomatic across all features of the illness,
introducing a more severe and complex presentation overall. Finally, because of the
short length of stay (~ six days) and the average length of time between hospital
admission and testing, the current sample may have been experiencing increased stress
and anxiety following the recent inpatient admission. This distress could result in an
overall increase in negative affect, and may be a contributing factor in the significance of
negative affect in thought disorder severity. While the PANAS asks for an “in the
moment” rating of affective experience, adjustment to an inpatient unit likely has some
residual effects that may contribute to one’s affective state for several days.
Setting. The testing setting also introduced a number of factors that limit the
generalizability of the current results. First, there was no designated testing location;
individuals were tested in a group room that at times was frequented by other patients.
While intrusions were discouraged as much as possible, the testing location was part of
the larger unit milieu and therefore needed to remain open and available to other patients.
Therefore, interruptions did occur and may have contributed to distraction during the
testing. Distraction could have disrupted the cognitive process such that (a) participants
may have exhibited increased difficulty with organization due to disruption of the task
and focus, (b) participants may have benefited from the distraction after being awarded
an opportunity to redirect their attention, and/or (c) participants may have felt less
comfortable sharing their thoughts with others coming in and out of the room. A handful
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of participants were irritated with others coming in and out of the room, and some even
became angry and yelled at the other patients entering the room. Depending on the
progression of the testing battery when this occurred, one might expect that disruptions
for these particular individuals could contribute to increased negative affect, which in
turn may have impacted performance on the Rorschach and TDI scores. While
qualitative notes were kept about these types of occurrences, these were not specifically
captured or assessed in any measure or analyses.
Participants were also not able to be uniformly tested at the same time each day
because of the inpatient group schedule and the availability of appropriate testing space
(the group room was the primary testing location), and the availability of the research
group. Therefore, some participants were tested in the evening on a weekday, while
others were tested at a variety of different times on weekends. This is significant given
that the weekday schedule includes several therapist-led groups during the day and the
weekend has none. While no behavioral differences were observed, this could contribute
to differences in performance, as one testing environment may have been more taxing
than the other. Physical and cognitive fatigue can contribute to disorganization of
thought and variations in affect. Therefore, a more taxing day on the unit may impact
one’s ability to engage in the task, and may result in performance that looks more or less
disorganized depending on the demands of the day.
Administration. All members of the research team participated in an intensive,
three-day training on Rorschach administration and TDI scoring, as well as regular
practice sessions prior to testing. However, the current sample represents the first group
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of individuals formally assessed by this research group and may be less uniform across
testers than later samples evaluated by this group.
Future Work
Efforts to examine the proposed relationship between affect and thought disorder
in schizophrenia involve several areas of study, all of which are reviewed in some detail
in the current research.
Procedure. The current work should be expanded to include mood induction
procedures to explore the impact of induced positive and negative affective states and
thought disorder severity. Broadening the current paradigm would allow for comparison
of trait (as explored in the current research) versus state (via mood-induction paradigms)
affect, and exploration of the robustness of the relationship between affect and thought
disorder in schizophrenia. A variety of mood-induction paradigms have been developed;
a recent meta-analysis provides a comprehensive list of procedures used with this
population (Cohen & Minor, 2010).
Sample. The current sample should be increased and replicated within other
inpatient samples to examine stability of the current findings. As stated earlier, the
current inpatient sample is characteristically indigent and is therefore not representative
of other patients who are psychiatric inpatients. Moreover, this particular inpatient unit
has an average length of stay of six days; the patients’ symptom characteristics likely
differ from inpatient units with a more chronic sample and longer length of treatment.
The relationship between affect and thought disorder in schizophrenia and
schizoaffective disorder should also be conducted with outpatient samples to examine the
similarities and areas of heterogeneity across these samples. The current project has
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recently been expanded to include a sample of individuals at a local outpatient care unit
that specializes in low income, chronically ill adults with severe psychiatric illness. The
addition of this sample will likely highlight other physical and psychiatric factors, and
socioeconomic stressors that may exacerbate disordered thought in schizophrenia and
schizoaffective disorder including homelessness, access to resources, substance use, and
medication status (use, compliance, etc.).
There are other factors that may moderate the relationship between affect and
thought disorder severity and are worthy of examination. An expanded version of the
current study includes the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR; Wechsler, 2001) to
explore the role of premorbid IQ in thought disorder severity. Measures of reading level
are utilized frequently to assess level of intelligence prior to illness onset, and the
subsequent cognitive decline that often follows. Exploration of affect should also be
expanded to include measures of specific affective experiences such as the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI;
Beck & Steer, 1990), and the Profile of Mood States (POMS; Lorr & McNair, 1988)
which explores the following scales: tension-anxiety; anger-hostility; fatigue-inertia;
depression-dejection; vigor-activity; and confusion-bewilderment. Moderation analyses,
similar to the work conducted by Basso et al., 1994, should be explored to examine
affective intensity as a moderator of affect valence and thought disorder severity.
Finally, given the support for the role of disposition posited in the literature examining
affective intensity and cognitive functioning (Larsen et al., 1987; Schimmack & Diener,
1997), personality factors should be explored as a moderator of the relationship between
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affective intensity and valence, and thought disorder severity in schizophrenia and
schizoaffective disorder.
Broaden current analyses. The current work examines fundamental questions
related to the relationship between affect and thought disorder in schizophrenia and
schizoaffective disorder. Results from the present study can be expanded in a variety of
ways to more fully explore thought disorder in schizophrenia and schizoaffective. The
TDI allows for detailed exploration of thought disorder at the exemplar level, as was
explored in a limited manner here, as well as the category and severity levels.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b should be expanded to include exemplars from the 1.0
severity level. While it was initially thought that exemplars at the 1.0 level were rare, the
current sample demonstrated twenty-two instances of incoherent responses and one
instance of contamination. Therefore, future analyses with a larger sample could likely
include exemplars at the 1.0 level. Future analyses will pursue the EFA proposed in the
current research when the sample and frequency of noted exemplars increase. In
addition, there are four categories to examine: deviant verbalizations, associative,
combinatory, and disorganized. These categories should each be explored, including
their relationship with PANAS total score and NA and PA scores. Analyses should also
be conducted at each severity level (0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 1.0). The frequency of
responses at each severity level can be calculated and compared to PANAS total scores,
and NA and PA scores. These severity levels can be further dichotomized into minor but
odd responses (0.25 + 0.50) and distinct presence of thought disorder (0.75 +1.0). This
represents yet another perspective from which to explore the impact of affective intensity
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and valence on not only thought disorder severity, but also the clear presence versus
absence of thought disorder as well.
In addition to the category and severity levels present in the TDI, the total number
of responses and measures of verbosity/poverty of speech may be useful with regard to
the their respective relationships with affective intensity and valence.
Finally, total TDI scores can be categorized into clinically significant severity
groups: >= 12 is clinically significant; 12-15 is mild elevation; 16-19 is moderate
elevation, and >= 20 is severe elevation. These categories can be used to further examine
the relationship between thought disorder severity and affect intensity and valence. The
current sample includes 18 individuals that fall in the severe category, three in the
moderate category, and three below clinical significance.
Expand the exploration of affect. The study of affect in schizophrenia is of the
utmost importance, given the somewhat limited but significant literature that is available.
Routine assessment of affect including self-report of current emotional experience and
changes in affect should be conducted to (1) improve understanding of the affective
experience, (2) ensure the differentiation of negative affect and negative symptoms
(Malla, 1995), and (3) monitor affect in relation to other core features of schizophrenia
including, but not limited to thought disorder. Furthermore, assessment should include
indices of valence and intensity for a detailed explication of how thought disorder in
schizophrenia may be differentially affected by positive versus negative affective states
and on a continuum of intensity. It is unclear if experiences such as irritability,
depression, and euphoria in schizophrenia are differentially exacerbated by increasing
intensity levels, and whether these changes contribute to different manifestations of
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thought disorder; exploration of this idea will clarify the role of affect in thought disorder
in schizophrenia and extrapolate to different affective states significant to mania (i.e.,
euphoria versus irritability).
To develop a comprehensive picture of the moderating effects of affect on thought
disorder in schizophrenia, it is also important to explore this relationship in more detail in
schizoaffective disorder. Differing from schizophrenia by the presence of a significant
affective episode, schizoaffective disorder provides a unique sample with which to
explore the proposed conceptualization of thought disorder and affect in schizophrenia.
While the diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder implies clinically significant emotional
dysregulation, it is unclear to what extent these individuals exhibit the same difficulties in
emotional expression and weak emotion-cognition associations described in
schizophrenia. Therefore, the assessment procedures described above should be
implemented in this population as well to establish a comprehensive picture of affective
experience in the schizophrenia spectrum. Other testable hypotheses include differences
in thought disorder in schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder when controlling for
affect, differences in affect intensity between individuals with schizoaffective disorder
characterized by depression compared to those characterized by mania, and each of these
subgroups compared with individuals with a primary diagnosis of depression and mania,
respectively.
Implications
The current study has significant implications for understanding the role of affect
in thought disorder in schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder. This study appears to
be the first to directly examine the relationship between thought disorder and affect
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intensity and valence in schizophrenia and schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, and
represents the initial steps in what is hoped to be a new area of study. The current
research is not novel in the constructs that it examines, but in the manner in which it does
so. While both thought disorder and affect have been studied in schizophrenia, recent
research suggests that there is still much to be learned about thought disorder in
schizophrenia and schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, and affect may be a significant
contributing factor in the presentation and severity of this impairment. The current study
represents the first steps by examining fundamental questions regarding the relationship
between thought disorder and affect. Overall, thought disorder needs to be systematically
evaluated with the appropriate measures and throughout stages of treatment and recovery
to better understand the features that are related to the remission of symptoms. The
current study hypothesizes that targeting affective disturbance will provide more
immediate effects on thought disorder severity and reduce the likelihood of a more
persistent and unremitting course.
Studies of thought disorder in affective disorders and schizoaffective disorder
suggest that those who receive treatment targeting mood lability or other affective
symptoms also see a decrease in thought disorder symptoms. While there is no direct
evidence of these affective symptoms also remitting in the same fashion, it can be
postulated that if affect is not a targeted area of intervention, as can be the case in
schizophrenia, thought disorder is likely to endure in a chronic fashion. This may be due
to a similar imbalance in regulatory systems implicated in thought disorder in mania
(Lake, 2008) that likely persists in schizophrenia in the absence of intervention. This
conceptualization further suggests that if affect is addressed and treated early in
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schizophrenia then thought disorder might be less likely to persist in the enduring, severe
manner for which it is well known.
In addition to the novel exploration of the relationship between thought disorder
and affect in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, the current study also supports work that
formulates thought disorder as a form of cognitive dysfunction; significant relationships
have been shown for measures of working memory (Docherty, 2005; Docherty, Hall, &
Gordinier, & Cutting, 2000; Docherty et al., 1996b; Docherty, Strauss, Dinzeo, & StHilaire, 2006; Kearns, 2007; Stirling, Hellewell, Blakey, Deakin, 2006); attention
(Docherty, 2005; Docherty et al., 2000; Docherty et al., 1996b; Docherty et al., 2006;
Subotnik et al., 2006); fluency (Docherty et al., 1996b; Stirling et al., 2006), memory
(Docherty et al., 2000; Subotnik et al., 2006), and nonverbal sorting ability (Harrow et
al., 2003). Moreover, both cognitive dysfunction and thought disorder are both early
symptoms of the illness that often remain stable and intractable despite antipsychotic
medication (Goldberg & Green, 1995). Therefore, it may be that in addition to
treatments for affective dysregulation that may decrease the severity of thought disorder
symptoms presently, treatments for cognitive dysfunction such as Cognitive
Enhancement Therapy (Hogarty & Greenwald, 2006) or Cognitive Remediation Therapy
(Wykes et al., 2007) when used in conjunction with treatment for affective disturbance
may contribute to an amelioration of symptoms over time as brain function improves.
This latter point needs further exploration as thought disorder is not evaluated separately
from other features of cognitive dysfunction in treatment studies, and cannot be measured
with typical neuropsychological batteries alone.
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The findings from this study have significant implications for treatment of
thought disorder in schizophrenia. The current review clearly illustrates the limited
impact of antipsychotic medication for thought disorder. Extrapolation from studies of
thought disorder in individuals with schizoaffective disorder suggests that treatment for
affective disturbance may be beneficial (Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Harrow et al., 1986b;
Holzman et al., 1986; Marengo & Harrow, 1997). Furthermore, Cognitive Behavior
Therapy (CBT), the second most preferred treatment for schizophrenia by clinicians has
proven to be an efficacious and effective treatment for many symptoms of the illness
(Wykes et al., 2008). However, this intervention has limited support for thought disorder
with no studies in a recent meta-analysis examining the use of CBT for thought disorder,
specifically Wykes et al. (2008), and only brief acknowledgment in a manual for CBT of
schizophrenia (Kingdon & Turkington, 2008). While Kingdon and Turkington (2008)
discuss that “emotional disturbance may be a significant feature of thought disorder”
(Kingdon & Turkington, 2008, p. 134) and that, if recognized, “a different approach route
may be needed” (Kingdon & Turkington, 2008, p. 134), they make no recommendations
for how to do so. Findings from the current study will likely provide additional support
for the role of affect in thought disorder that, according to Kingdon and Turkington
(2008) would constitute a modified treatment strategy than what is currently employed.
One example may be the adjunctive use of a cognitive remediation program.
As the current research trend in schizophrenia continues on the path of genetic
mapping and functional MRI topographies, the need for exploration of endophenotypic
features and treatments that are directly applicable to symptoms and the phenomenology
of the illness is argued here. The possibility of finding the etiology or cause of
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schizophrenia is incredibly attractive, but sole reliance on that work often detracts us
from focusing on remission of symptoms, reintegration into the community, and
improved quality of life for people suffering with schizophrenia. Several recent papers
(Andreasen, 2007, Parnas, 2011; Strauss, 2011) have alluded to this conundrum and
suggest that a return to the phenomenology of core schizophrenia symptoms such as
thought disorder, affective experience, and the “whatness” of the illness (Parnas, 2011)
will lead to the greatest pay-off for individuals living with this illness.
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Table 1
Thought Disorder Definitions (Andreasen, 1979a)
	
  
Poverty of
Restriction in the amount of spontaneous speech
speech
Poverty of
Amount of speech is adequate, but language is vague, concrete, and
content
repetitive
of speech
Pressure of
An increase in the amount of spontaneous speech
speech
Distractible
Disruption in the course of speech as evidenced by stopping in the
speech
middle of a sentence and changing the subject in response to a nearby
stimulus
Tangentiality
Replying to a question in an oblique, tangential, or irrelevant manner
Derailment
A pattern of spontaneous speech in which the ideas slip off the track
(loose
onto another one that is clearly but obliquely related, or completely
associations,
unrelated
flight of ideas)
Incoherence
A pattern of speech that is essentially incomprehensible at times
(word salad)
Illogicality
A pattern of speech in which conclusions are reached that do not
follow logically
Clanging
A pattern of speech in which sounds rather than meaningful
relationships appear to govern word choice
Neologisms
A completely new word or phrase whose derivation cannot be
understood
Word
Old words that are used in a new or unconventional way, or new
Approximations words that are developed by conventional rules of word formation
Circumstantiality A pattern of speech that is very indirect and delayed in reaching its
goal idea
Loss of goal
Failure to follow a chain of thought through to its natural conclusion
Perseveration
Persistent repetition of words, ideas, or subjects
Echolalia
A pattern of speech in which words or phrases of others are echoed
Blocking
Interruption of a train of speech before a thought or idea has been
completed
Stilted Speech
Speech that has an excessively stilted or formal quality
Self-reference
A pattern of speech in which the subject under discussion is referred
back to oneself when either the person in question or another is
speaking
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Table 2
Measures of Thought Disorder
	
  
Name of
Scoring system
Communication
Disturbances
Index (CDI)

Index of
Positive
Thought
Disorder
(IPTD)

Authors
Docherty,
DeRosa, &
Andreasen,
1996)

(Marengo et
al., 1986)

Level of
measurement
Subtype

Global,
severity

Measure of
Thought Disorder
Semi-structured
interview

Gorham Proverbs Test
WAIS Comprehension
subtest
Goldstein-Scheerer
Object Sorting Test

Scoring system

Subtypes

Psychometrics

Responses are scored
for the frequency of
each of six types of
communication failure:

1. Vague references
2. Confused
references
3. Missing
information
references
4. Ambiguous word
meanings
5. Wrong word
references
6. Structural
unclarities

IRR:

1. Overall score from
each response ranging
from absent to severe:

N/A

0: Idiosyncratic
verbalizations are
absent
0.5: Mild cognitive
slips
1: A definite
characteristic or
bizarre response
3: A very severe
bizarre response
2. Continuum score
based on total summed
scores from measures:
1: Absent
2: Mild
3: Definite
4: Severe
5: Very severe
3. Composite index
score used to assign
individual to the
highest/most severe
level from the IPTD
tests (continuum
ratings 1-5)
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Vague:
r = .73
Confused:
r = .88
Missing:
r = .89
Ambiguous:
r = .88
Wrong word:
r = .80
Structural:
r = .93
Total CDI:
r = .94
IRR: r = .85
Comprehension
and Proverbs:
r = .64
Comprehension
and Object:
r = .50
Proverbs and
Object:
r = .60

	
  
Name of
Scoring system
Scale for the
Assessment of
Thought,
Language, and
Communication
(TLC)

Authors
(Andreasen,
1979a;
1979b)

Level of
measurement
Subtypes,
severity

Measure of
Thought Disorder
Scores based on a 45
minute open-ended
interview; psychiatric
symptomatology is
not discussed

Scoring system

Subtypes

Ratings of each of the
18 subtypes of thought
disorder based on a 0-4
(1-9) or 0-3 (10-18)
scale:

1. Poverty of speech
2. Poverty of
content of speech
3. Pressure of
speech
4. Distractible
speech
5. Tangentiality
6. Derailment
7. Incoherence
8. Illogicality
9. Clanging
10. Neologisms
11. Word
approximations
12.
Circumst
antiality
13. Loss of goal
14. Perseveration
15. Echolalia
16. Blocking
17. Stilted speech
18. Self-reference

0: Absent
1: Mild (occurs once)
2. Moderate (occurs
2 to 4 times)
3. Severe (occurs five
or more times)
OR
0. None
1. Mild (occurs once)
2. Moderate (occurs
2 to 4 times)
3. Severe (occurs 5 to
10 times)
4. Extreme (occurs
more than 10 times, or
so frequently that the
interview is
incomprehensible)
Thought and
Language
Index (TLI)

(Liddle et
al., 2002)

Subtypes,
severity

1-minute responses to
eight Rorschach or
Thematic
Apperception Test
items

Responses are scored
for the presence and
severity of 8 subtypes
of thought disorder:
0.25: Minor
idiosyncrasies
0.50: Distinct oddness
0.75: Instability of
thinking and
perception, absurdity
1.0: Complete loss of
reality
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Impoverishment
Poverty of Speech
Weakening of Goal
Disorganization
Looseness
Peculiar Word Use
Peculiar sentence
construction
Peculiar Logic
Non-specific
dysregulation
Perseveration
Distractibility

Psychometrics
See Andreasen
(1979a) for
weighted k for
all definitions.
Weighted k for
global score:
k = .89

IRR (range):
r = .60
(peculiar word
use) –
r = .93
(poverty of
speech)
Impoverishment
IRR:
r = .88
Disorganization
IRR:
r = .82

	
  
Name of
Scoring system
Thought
Disorder Index
(TDI)

Authors
(Johnston &
Holzman,
1979;
Johnston et
al.,1986)

Level of
measurement
Subtypes,
severity

Measure of
Thought Disorder
Scores based on
responses from the
Rorschach or
Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale

Scoring system

Subtypes

Responses are scored
based on presence of
subtypes that represent
a continuum of
severity:

0.25
Inappropriate
distance
Vagueness
Peculiar
verbalization
Word-finding
difficulty
Clang
Perseveration
Relationship
verbalization
Incongruous
combination

0.25: Minor
idiosyncrasies
0.50: Distinct
oddness
0.75: Instability of
thinking and
perception, absurdity
1.0: Complete loss of
reality

Intermediate 0.25,
0.50
Idiosyncratic
symbolism
0.50
Queer response
Confusion
Looseness
Fabulized
combination
0.75
Fluidity
Absurd response
Confabulation
Autistic Logic
1.0
Contamination
Incoherence
Neologism

Note. IRR = Interrater reliability.
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Psychometrics
IRR: r = .90

	
  

Table 3
Thought Disorder Literature Reviewed
Study

Sample characteristics

Thought
Disorder
Measure

Follow-up

Outcomes for
Thought Disorder

Sample

Sample
Composition

Diagnostic
Procedure

Gender
(% Male)

Medication (%)

N = 113

Sz = 45
Mania = 32
Depression = 36

RDC

Sz = 60%
Mania = 44%
Depression =
39%

“Nearly all
receiving
medication” (p.
1326)

TLC

None

PFTD/NFTD model significantly
discriminated Sz and mania, and
within Sz:
PFTD – Acute Sz and mania
NFTD – Chronic Sz

Sz = 50
SAD = 25
Mania = 25
Control = 94

RDC

Sz = 20%
SAD = 44%
Mania = 48%
Control = 41%

“Nearly all
receiving
medication” (p.
350)

TLC

FU1: 6
months
after index

Acute:
Sig. distributions for most TLC
elements
Sz and SAD distributions similar
Mania > all, SAD, Sz (PFTD
versus NFTD)

(Andreasen, 1979b)
Inpatient at
index
(Andreasen
& Grove, 1986)

N = 194
Inpatient at
index

94

FU1:
Mania, SAD > Sz
(Remittance, n.s.)
Sz > Mania, SAD (persistent
disorganization)
1999)

(Cuesta & Peralta,
1999)

N = 253
Inpatient at
index

	
  

All Sz

DSM-III-R

67%

Antipsychotics =
100%
AP + Antichol =
62%

TLC

None

Best fitting model: 6 factor
negative, idiosyncrasies,
semantics, attention, reference,
disorganization model
(GFI = 0.945, RMSR = 0.077)

	
  

Study

Sample characteristics
Sample

Sample
Composition

Diagnostic
Procedure

Gender
(% Male)

Medication (%)

N = 113

Sz = 48
Mania = 34
NP = 31
MDD and
mDD

RDC

Total = 60%

Medication at Index
(no med details):
Sz = 29%
Mania = 37.5%
NP = 21%

Thought
Disorder
Measure

Follow-up

Outcomes for
Thought Disorder

IPTD

FU1: 7
weeks after
index

Acute:
Mania > Sz
Mania, Sz > NP

(Harrow et al., 1982)
Inpatient at
index

FU1:
No difference in severity
Mania > Sz (greater reduction)

FU1:
Sz = 76%
AP only = 100%
Mania = 83%
Lith only = 58.3%
Lith + AP = 25%
None = 16.7%
(Harrow et al., 1986a)
N = 94

95

Inpatient at
index

(Harrow
& Marengo, 1986)

N = 191
Inpatient at
index

	
  

Sz = 30
Mania = 34
NP = 30
MDD = 21
mDD = 4
Other = 5
Control = 34

RDC

Total = 61%
Mania = 55%
Control= 53%

Medication at FU1:
Sz = 77%
AP only = 91%
Mania = 62%
Lith = 26%
Lith + AP = 15%
AP only = 21%
None = 38%

IPTD

FU1: 1 year
after index

Sz = 44
PNS = 67
MDD = 13
Mania = 16
SADd = 21
SADm = 5
Unspecified = 12
NP = 80
MDD = 49
mDD = 5
Mania = 4
Other = 22

RDC (primary)
& DSM-III

Sz = 61%
PNS = 52%
NP = 39%

Antipsychotics at
FU1:
Sz = 53%
PNS = 33%
NP = 13%

IPTD

FU1: 1.5-2
yrs after
DC

Antipsychotics at
FU2:
Sz = 59%
PNS = 36%
NP = 8%

FU2: 3.5-4
yrs after
DC

FU1:
Sz > NP
Sz = Mania
Mania = NP

FU1:
Sz, PNS > NP
FU2:
No difference

	
  

Study

Sample characteristics

(Harrow et al.,
1986b)

Follow-up

Outcomes for
Thought Disorder

IPTD

FU1: 1.8
yrs after
index

Acute:
Sz > PNS, NP (RDC, DSM-III)
PNS > NP (DSM-III)

Sample

Sample
Composition

Diagnostic
Procedure

Gender
(% Male)

Medication (%)

N = 166

Sz = 48
PNS = 51
MDD = 13
Mania = 9
SADd = 14
SADm = 5
Substance = 3
Unspecified = 7
NP = 67
MDD = 38
mDD = 9
Mania = 1
Hypoman= 2
Other = 17

RDC
& DSM-III

Total = 46%

Antipsychotics at
Index:
Sz = 83%
PNS = 67%
NP = 23%

Sz = 22
Mania = 21

DSM-III

Sz = 82%
Mania = 81%

Antipsychotics at
Index:
Sz = 100%
Mania = 100%
AP only = 52%
Lith = 48%

TLC

None

Sz = 22
Mania = 19

DSM-III

Sz = 45%
Mania = 47%

Medication at
Index:
Sz =
Antichol = 82.5%
Mania =
Antichol = 57%

TLC

FU1: 8
months
after index

Inpatient at
index

(Harvey
& Brault, 1986)

Thought
Disorder
Measure

N = 43

FU1:
Sz > PNS, NP (RDC, DSM-III)

Antipsychotics at
FU1:
Sz = 52%
PNS = 36%
NP = 13%

96

Inpatient at
index

Acute:
Sz > Mania (POS, POC)
Mania > Sz (pressured)

(Harvey et al., 1990)
N = 41
Inpatient at
index

Medication at FU1:
Sz =
AP = 82%
Antichol = 68.5%
Mania =
AP = 52%
Lith = 63%
Antichol = 52.5%

	
  

Acute:
No difference between Sz and
Mania
FU1:
All thought disorder ratings
consistent over 10 days

	
  

Study

Sample characteristics

Thought
Disorder
Measure

Follow-up

Outcomes for
Thought Disorder

Sample

Sample
Composition

Diagnostic
Procedure

Gender
(% Male)

Medication (%)

N = 40

Sz = 20
Mania = 20

DSM-III

Sz = 75%
Mania = 70%

Medication at
Index:
Sz = 100%
AP only = 100%
Mania = 100%
AP only, Lith, or
Lith + AP

TLC

None

Acute:
Sz > Mania (POC, NFTD)
Mania > Sz (pressured, PFTD)

All Sz

DSM-III

100%

Antipsychotics for
≥ 1 week: 30%
Medication free for
≥ 2 weeks: 25%
Antipsychotic
medication < 1
week or medication
free for < 2 weeks:
45%

TLC

None

Best fitting model: 2-factor verbal
productivity/disconnection model
(GFI = 0.915)

Sz = 43
Mania = 20
SAD = 22
SADd = 10
SADm = 12
Control = 22

DSM-III &
RDC

Sz = 82%
Mania = 67%
SAD = 53%
Control = 36%

Medication at
Index:
Sz = 95%
AP only = 100%
Mania = 100%
Lith, Lith + AP =
85%
AP only = 10%
Anxiolytic = 5%
SAD = 95.5%
AP only = 38%
Lith + AP or Lith
+ nonAP = 57%
Unspecified = 5%

TDI

None

Acute:
Sz > SADd
Controls < all
SAD ≈ Mania
SADm ≈ Sz

(Harvey et al., 1984)
Inpatient at
index

(Harvey et al., 1992)
N = 142
Inpatient at
index
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(Holzman et al.,
1986)

N = 107
Inpatient at
index

	
  

	
  

Study

Sample characteristics

(Jampala et al.,
1985)

Sample

Sample
Composition

Diagnostic
Procedure

Gender
(% Male)

Medication (%)

N = 165

Sz = 31
Mania = 134
Blunt = 14
Non-blunt = 120

(See Taylor &
Abrams 1978)

Sz = 58%
Blunt = 43%
Non-blunt = 30%

No discussion of
specific medications

Sz = 31
Mania – 111
TD = 9
No TD = 102

Washington
University
criteria (Mania)

Inpatient at
index

Thought
Disorder
Measure

Follow-up

Outcomes for
Thought Disorder

Unspecified

None

Acute:
Blunt > Sz
Blunt > Non-blunt

Unspecified

FU1:
discharge
from
hospital

Acute:
Mania > Sz (severity)
Mania > Sz (nonseq, FOI)
Sz >Mania (bizarre)
Mania w/ TD > Mania w/o TD
(mood lability)

Lifetime exposure
to antipsychotics
(months):
Sz = 33.8
Mania/Blunt = 36
Mania/Non-blunt =
13.91

(Jampala et al., 1989)
N = 142
Inpatient at
index

Unspecified

Lifetime exposure
to antipsychotics
(months):
Sz = 33.9
Mania w/TD = 25.4
Mania w/o TD =
13.3

Taylor-Abrams
criteria (Sz)

98
(Marengo
& Harrow, 1985)

N = 324
Inpatient at
index

	
  

Sz = 85
PNS = 132
MDD = 32
Mania = 38
SADd = 30
SADm = 15
Other = 17
NP = 107
MDD = 60
mdd = 16
Mania = 6
Other = 25
Control = 30

RDC (primary)
& DSM-III

No discussion of
specific medications

Total = 51%

Antipsychotics at
Index:
Sz = 63%
Mania = 49%
Other PNS = 36%
NP = 18%

FU1:
Sz > mania (severity)

IPTD

None

Acute:
Mania > Sz >PNS

	
  

Study

Sample characteristics

(Marengo
& Harrow, 1997)

Sample

Sample
Composition

Diagnostic
Procedure

Gender
(% Male)

Medication (%)

N = 180

Sz = 45
SAD = 26
PNS = 33
MDD = 8
BP = 19
Other = 6
NP = 76
MDD = 43
Dysthy = 4
BP = 6
Hypoman = 2
Eat DO = 4
Anxiety = 3
PDs = 14

RDC

Sz = 60%
SAD = 61%
PNS = 48%
NP = 40%

Antipsychotics at
no FUs:
Sz = 24%
SAD = 31%
PNS = 58%
NP = 85%

Inpatient at
index

Thought
Disorder
Measure

Follow-up

Outcomes for
Thought Disorder

IPTD

FU1: 2 yrs
after index

FU:
Sz > SAD, PNS, NP (persistence)
Sz > NP (FUs 2 & 3)
Sz > PNS (FU3)
SAD > NP (FUs 2 & 3)

FU2: 4.5
yrs after
index

Antipsychotics at 1
or 2 FUs:
Sz = 31%
SAD = 31%
PNS = 33%
NP = 14%

FU3: 7.5
yrs after
index

99

Antipsychotics at
all FUs:
Sz = 45%
SAD = 38%
PNS = 9%
NP = 1%
(Osher & Bersudsky,
2007)

N = 26

BPeuthymic = 18
Controls = 8

DSM-IV

BPeuthymic =
50%
Controls = 50%

Unspecified

Rorschach

None

Acute:
BPeuthymic > Controls

Sz = 97
Core = 60
Noncore = 37
SAD = 73
Mania = 62

DSM-III

Unspecified

Unspecified

Unspecified

None

Acute:
Sz > Mania (hypoverbal,
frequency)
Mania > Sz (hyperverbal)
Core Sz  hypoverbal; Non-core
 hyperverbal

Outpatient at
Index
(Taylor et al., 1994)
N = 232
Inpatient at
index

	
  

Present
versus
absent

	
  

Study

Sample characteristics
Sample

Sample
Composition

Diagnostic
Procedure

Gender
(% Male)

Medication (%)

N = 118

Sz = 72
Control = 46

DSM-IV

Sz = 61%
Control = 56.5%

Antipsychotic
medication:
Sz = 97%

Thought
Disorder
Measure

Follow-up

Outcomes for
Thought Disorder

TLI

None

Sz < Control (QoL)
TLI unrelated to QoL or
depression

(Ulas et al., 2008)
16%
inpatient at
index

Note. Antichol= anticholinergic medication; AP = antipsychotic medication; BP = bipolar disorder; DSM = Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; DC = discharge; Dysthy = dysthymia;
FOI = flight of ideas; FU = follow-up; Hypoman = hypomania; IPTD = Index of Positive Thought Disorder; Lith = lithium; MDD = major depressive disorder; mDD = minor depressive disorder; NFTD
= Negative formal thought disorder; Nonseq = nonsequiters; NP = nonpsychotic; PD = personality disorder; PFTD = Positive formal thought disorder; PNS = psychotic/not schizophrenic; POC =
poverty of content of speech; POS = poverty of speech, QoL = Quality of life; RDC = research diagnostic criteria; Sz = schizophrenia; SAD = schizoaffective disorder; TD = thought disorder; TLC =
Thought and Language Index; TLI = Thought and Language Index.
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Table 4
Thought Disorder Inventory Response Categories Using the Rorschach Inkblot Test (Holzman, Levy, & Johnston, 2005; D. L. Levy,
personal communication, July 21, 2011)
	
  
0.25 Level
Inappropriate distance

Flippancy
Vagueness
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Peculiar verbalization
Word-finding difficulty
Clang
Perseveration
Incongruous combinations
0.5 Level
Relationship verbalization
Idiosyncratic symbolism
Queer verbalizations
Confusion
Looseness
Fabulized combinations
Playful confabulations

	
  

Increase of distance: failing to recognize that the inkblot is merely a stimulus for a response and unable to consider what it
“looks like” rather than what “it is”
Loss of distance: becoming personally involved with the inkblot, including aversive verbal reactions or behaviors
Concreteness: awarding underserved reality to incidental aspects of the blot
Overspecificity: responses involving an effort at excessive and unwarranted precision
Flippant remarks, gratuitous joke telling, or wise cracks that depart from the usual social constraints of a testing situation
A response that contains too little information to score as a Rorschach response and may be a short cryptic phrase or a long,
meandering, circumstantial paragraph
Odd words or phrases that may have a recognizable meaning but do not fit the context in which they are used
Simple absence of knowledge about what word to use
Rhyming or alliterative phrases
A response that has poor form with regard to the inkblot is repeated at least three times
Single details of a blot that are contiguous with each other are merged into a single response

Linking the current response to a prior one on a previous card and relating the two separate percepts
Color symbolism: relationship between color and form are idiosyncratic
Image symbolism: using concrete images to represent abstract ideas in an idiosyncratic way and with an air of reality rather
than playfulness
On a continuum with peculiar verbalizations with the exception that the examiner is generally uncertain about what is meant
by the word or phrase used
Responses reflecting a loss of train of thought, and respondents are unsure what they are seeing or saying, indicating some
disorientation
Losing focus of the communication; taking off into an unrelated, tangential or arbitrary area
On a continuum with incongruous combinations; percept and ideas are condensed into conclusions that violate reality
considerations about relationships between images, blot qualities, and objects
Fabulized combinations that are fancifully overelaborated and typically involve humorous and playful images

	
  

Fragmentation

Clear inability to integrate separate elements into a whole percept

0.75 Level
Fluidity
Absurd verbalizations
Confabulations

Autistic logic

Something seen as one thing at one instance will be seen as a different object at the next instant
Responses that are totally arbitrary, and bear little if any resemblance to objective reality
Extreme elaboration: carrying to an extreme an elaborative ideational tendency that extends the percept beyond the bounds of
reality constraints
Details in one area generalized to a larger area: single small detail is clearly perceived, but is then used to interpret the entire
inkblot in a way that violates the shape of the larger area
Justifying a response by rationalizing it with a “because” state that is illogical or based on private autistic reasoning processes
rather than conventional, logical reasoning

1.0 Level
Contamination
Incoherence
Neologisms
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Two separate and unrelated percepts are merged into one
Responses that are unrelated to the task and are not possible for the examiner or scorer to understand in any context
New, invented words that do not violate English morphology or phonotactics, yet are not real words

	
  
Table 5
Sociodemographic Information for the Current Sample

Age

n
24

M (SD)
34.88 (15.61)

Skewness (SE)
1.41 (.472)

Kurtosis (SE)
1.12 (.918)

Days in hospital

20

5.7 (6.96)

3.45 (.512)

13.65 (.992)

Years of education

24

12.13 (1.26)

-.254 (.472)

1.173 (.918)

Age at first
psychotic episode

17

18.12 (7.53)

.161 (.550)

.527 (1.063)

Age at first
hospitalization

22

19.75 (8.57)

2.14 (.491)

6.91 (.953)

Number of
hospitalizations

22

16.41 (22.11)

2.98 (.491)

9.97 (.953)

Duration of illness

22

13.89 (10.22)

1.22 (.491)

1.799 (.953)

Frequency

Percent

19
5

79.2
20.8

14
3
1
6

58.3
12.5
4.2
25.0

4
20
0

16.7
83.3
0

Primary Axis I
Schizophrenia
Schizoaffective
Primary Axis I
specifier
Paranoid
Undifferentiated
Bipolar (SAD)
Missing
Sex
Female
Male
Other
Race
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White
African-American
Asian
Biracial-Multiracial
Other

15
8
0
0
1

62.5
33.3
0
0
4.2

Unsupervised in
house/apartment/etc.

15

62.5

Unsupervised in
rooming or boarding
house

2

8.3

Supervised in
Halfway house,
community house,
etc.

1

4.2

Homeless/Shelter

5

20.8

Other

1

4.2

Never

3

12.5

Self-medicate by
own criteria

2

8.3

Sometimes as
Prescribed

4

16.7

Usually takes as
Prescribed

4

16.7

Always take as
Prescribed

8

33.3

First time on
Meds

2

8.3

Missing

2

4.2

Living Status

Medication
Compliance
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Table 6
Sample Characteristics for Predictor and Criterion Variables
M (SD)

Min

Max

Skewness (SE)

Kurtosis (SE)

PANAS
Total Score

53.17 (11.52)

34.00

76.00

.225 (.472)

-.903 (.918)

PANAS NA

38.50 (17.89)

20.00

74.00

.690 (.472)

-.973 (.918)

PANAS PA

67.83 (15.90)

28.00

98.00

-.273 (.472)

.615 (.918)

TDI Total

40.62 (35.85)

4.17

128.75

1.48 (.472)

1.10 (.918)
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Table 7
Correlations for PANAS and TDI and Sociodemographic Variables
Age

Days in
hospital

Education
in years

PANAS total
score

-.305

-.103

PANAS NA

-.263

PANAS PA
TDI total
Age

Age at first
hospitalization

Number of
hospitalizations

Duration
of
illness

-.103

Age at
first
psychiatric
episode
-.125

-.211

-.209

-.261

-.003

-.130

-.247

-.156

-.253

-.285

-.147

-.174

-.003

.093

-.130

-.022

-.058

-.061

.079

.057

-.347

.113

-.189

-.125

__

Days in
hospital

.350

__

Education in
years

.113

.559

__

Age at first
psychiatric
episode

.566*

.408

.356

__

Age at first
hospitalization

.747**

-.233

.202

.616*

__

Total number
of
hospitalizations

.138

.440

-.129

.317

-.021

__

.830**

.050

-.327

.199

.250

.150

Duration of
illness

** p < .01 (2-tailed), * p < .05 (2-tailed)
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Table 8
Correlation analyses for PANAS and TDI and Sociodemographic Variables
PANAS total
score
__

PANAS NA

PANAS NA

.726**

__

PANAS PA

.633**

-.074

__

TDI total
score

.408*

.335

.215

PANAS total
score

** p < .01 (2-tailed)
* p < .05 (2-tailed)
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PANAS PA

TDI total
score

__

	
  

Table 9
Correlations for PANAS PA and NA and Exemplars of Top-Down Processing
PANAS
PA
PANAS
PA

PANAS
NA

Clang

Flippant

Rel.
Verb.

Idiosyn.
Symb.

Looseness

Fab.
Comb.

Playful
Confab.

Fluidity

Confab.

__

PANAS
NA

__

Clang

-.266

-.149

__

Flippant

.083

.256

-.043

__

a

a

a

a

__

Idiosyn. Symb.

-.373

.297

-.087

.239

a

__

Looseness

.057

.261

.035

-.090

a

-.183

__

Fab. Comb.

-.416*

.323

-.143

-.143

a

.697**

-.055

__

Playful
Confab.

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

__

Fluidity

.029

-.220

-.043

-.043

a

-.087

-.090

-.143

a

__

Confab.

.024

.369

-.113

-.120

a

.067

.187

.243

a

-.159

Rel. Verb.

108

__

* p < .05 (2-tailed)
** p < .01 (2-tailed)
a. Frequency = 0
Note. Confab. – confabulations; Fab. Comb. – fabulized combinations; Idio. Symb – idiosyncratic symbolism; NA – negative affect; Playful Confab. – playful
confabulations; PA – positive affect; Rel. Verb. – relationship verbalization;

	
  

	
  

Table 10
Correlations for PANAS PA and NA and Exemplars of Top-Down Processing
PANAS
NA
PANAS
NA
PANAS
PA
Word
Find.
Diff.
Vague

PANAS
PA

Word
Find.
Diff.

Vague

Inapp.
Dist.

Persev.

Incong.
Comb.

Fragment.

Autistic
Logic

__
__

109

-.125

-.051

__

-.222

.390

.013

__

Inapp.
Dist.
Persev.

.028

-.126

-.141

-.173

__

a

a

a

a

a

__

Incong.
Comb.

,093

-.169

.314

-.211

.111

a

__

Fragment.

-.232

.177

.150

.113

.330

a

-.010

__

Autistic
Logic

.423*

.136

-.043

-.111

-.141

a

-.140

-.083

__

* p < .05 (2-tailed)
a. Frequency = 0
Note. Fragment. – fragmentation; Inapp. Dist. – inappropriate distance; Incong. Comb. – incongruous combinations; NA – negative affect; PA – positive affect;
Persev. – perseveration; Word. Find. Diff. – word finding difficulty.

	
  

	
  
Table 11
Frequency of TDI Exemplars
TDI Exemplars

Frequency Count

Inappropriate Distance
Flippancy
Vague
Peculiar Verbalizations
Word-finding Difficulty
Clangs
Perseveration
Incongruous
Combinations
Internal /External
Response
Relationship
Verbalization
Idiosyncratic Symbolism
Queer
Confusion
Looseness
Fabulized Combinations
Playful Confabulations
Fragmentation
Fluidity
Absurd
Confabulations
Autistic Logic
Contamination
Incoherence
Neologisms

22
1
15
121
1
2
0
13

	
  

0
0
4
27
6
17
12
0
6
1
3
56
1
1
22
0

	
  

110

	
  

CURRICULUM VITAE

Rachel N. Waford
PERSONAL INFORMATION
Office Address:
Harvard Medical School/
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center/
Massachusetts Mental Health Center/
75 Fenwood Rd. #411
Boston, MA 02135
Phone: 617-626-9655

Home Address:
81 Strathmore Rd. #3
Boston, MA 02135
Phone: 270-303-6973

E-mail: rwaford@bidmc.harvard.edu
rachel.waford@louisville.edu

EDUCATION
Ph.D., Clinical Psychology, 2008-2013, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY
Dissertation Title: The Role of Affective Intensity and Valence in Thought Disorder Severity
in Schizophrenia.
Mentor: Richard R. J. Lewine, Ph.D.
M.A., Experimental Psychology, 2006, Western Kentucky University, Bowling Green, KY
Thesis Title: Assessing Head Start Children’s School Adjustment.
Advisor: Elizabeth A. Lemerise, Ph.D.
B.A., Psychology and Sociology, 2004, Western Kentucky University, Bowling Green, KY
Majors: Psychology and Sociology, Minor: Criminology

HONORS
May 2006

Outstanding Graduate Student of the Year, College of Education and
Behavioral Sciences, Western Kentucky University
May 2006
Experimental Psychology Graduate Student of the Year, Western
Kentucky University
May 2004
Outstanding Alpha Kappa Delta Undergraduate Student, Department of
Sociology, Western Kentucky University
CLINICAL AND RESEARH INTERESTS
Clinical interests include identifying and understanding prodromal features of psychotic
disorders, efficacy of early interventions, and treatment factors related to recovery and
community reintegration; and inpatient and emergency psychiatric populations, with a focus on
understanding the phenomenology of illness and inter- and intra-individual differences related to
engagement in outpatient treatment and recovery.

	
  

111

	
  
Current research interests include the relationship between affect and cognition in severe
psychopathology, and the development of and early intervention for psychotic disorders. Specific
areas of research include thought disorder in schizophrenia and the moderating role of affect on
the severity and course of this impairment. Recent training conducted by Dr. Deborah Levy from
McLean Hospital and ongoing work focus on the use of the Rorschach Inkblot Test and the
Thought Disorder Index to evaluate thought disorder in schizophrenia and other diagnostic
groups. Other areas of specific research interest include the factors related to early treatmentseeking and engagement in prodromal and first-episode populations, early intervention and
recovery, substance use, and familial support.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE
July 2008-Present: Affect and Cognition Lab: Doctoral Student, Advisor: Richard R. J.
Lewine, Ph.D.
• Hypothesis development, research, data analysis, and writing for the
following new and ongoing projects:
o Affect and Cognition in Severe Psychopathology (funded by
UofL IRIG)
 Moderating role of affect in thought disorder in
schizophrenia
 Impact of personality traits on the relationship between
affect and thought disorder
o Cognitive impairment, negative symptoms, and schizophrenia
o Implications of symptom severity versus diagnosis
o Mood Induction and Critical Thinking in Undergraduates
o Dysphoria and Academic Success in Undergraduates
• Supervision of graduate and undergraduate students involved in
research and training
June 2006-June 2008: Developmental Neuroscience Lab: Lab Coordinator/Project
Coordinator, Supervisor: Dennis L. Molfese, Ph.D.
• Impact of sleep loss and simulated micro-gravity on neuropsychological
functioning (funded by NASA)
o Record, analyze, and interpret event-related potential brain
imaging data
• Neuropsychological impact of sleep loss in children (funded by NIH)
o Record, analyze, and interpret event-related potential brain
imaging data
August 2003-May 2006: Social Development Lab: Undergraduate and Graduate
Research Assistant, Advisor: Elizabeth A. Lemerise, Ph.D.
• Investigate influence of peer relationships, emotion, and aggression in
cognitive, emotional, and social development in children

	
  

112

	
  
PEER-REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS
Lewine, R., Sommers, A., Waford, R. N., Bustanoby, H., Robertson, C., Hall, R., &
Eisenmenger, K. Sex, affect, and academic performance: It’s not what you think.
International Journal of the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning. In Press.
Waford, R. N. & Lewine, R. (2010). Is perseveration uniquely characteristic of
schizophrenia? Schizophrenia Research, 118, 128-133.
Lemerise, E. A, Fredstrom, B. K., McCormick, B. G., Bowersox, A. L., & Waford, R. N.
(2006). Do Provocateurs’ Emotion Displays Influence Children’s Social Goals
and Problem Solving? Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 34(4), 555-567.
PUBLICATIONS UNDER REVIEW
Waford, R. N. & Lewine, R. R. J. Integrating the study of affect and thought disorder in
schizophrenia. British Journal of Psychiatry (Manuscript under modification for
re-submission).
Lewine, R., Sommers, A., Waford, R. N. Robertson, C., & Hall, R. Setting the mood for
critical thinking in the classroom. Teaching of Psychology (Manuscript under
review).
PROFESSIONAL PRESENTATIONS
Waford, R. N., Robertson, C. R., Hart, M. A., & Lewine, R. (September, 2012). Do
affective intensity and valence moderate thought disorder severity in
schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder? Poster presented at the annual
meeting of Society for Research in Psychopathology, Ann Arbor, MI.
Waford, R. N. & Lewine, R. (September, 2011). The significance of affect in our
understanding of thought disorder in schizophrenia. Poster presented at the
annual meeting of Society for Research in Psychopathology, Boston, MA.
Robertson, C., Waford, R. N., & Lewine, R. (September, 2011). Cognitive perseveration
across diagnoses: A dimensional approach. Poster presented at the annual
meeting of Society for Research in Psychopathology, Boston MA.
Lewine, R. Sommers, A., Waford, R. N., & Robertson, C. (May, 2011). Mood and
Critical Thinking. Poster presented at i2a Conference, Louisville, KY.
Waford, R. N. & Lewine, R. (October, 2010). Negative symptoms and
neuropsychological functioning in schizophrenia: Implications for functional
outcome. Poster presented at Annual Meeting of Society for Research in
Psychopathology, Seattle, WA.
Waford, R. N., Robertson, C., & Lewine, R. (March, 2010). An Examination of Cognitive
Perseveration at the Symptoms Level. Poster presented at annual meeting of
Kentucky Psychological Association, Louisville, KY.
Waford, R. N. and Lewine, R. (September, 2009). Patients with OCD exhibit lower
cognitive perseveration than healthy individuals: Implications and Questions.
Poster presented at Annual Meeting of Society for Research in Psychopathology,
Minneapolis, MN.
Waford, R. N. and Lewine, R. (September, 2008). Perseveration in Individuals with
Schizophrenia, Bipolar Disorder, and Major Depression. Poster presented at
annual meeting of Society for Research in Psychopathology, Pittsburgh, PA.
Molfese, D. L., Molfese, V. J., Barnes, M., Starkey, G., Tucker, L., Millis, B., Pratt, N.,
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Waford, R. N., & Gozal, D. (March, 2009). ERP Measures of Brain Activity
Predict the Effects of Sleep Restriction on Attention. Symposium on Brain
Measures of Cognitive Functioning: Understanding the Roles of Environment and
Phenotype. Paper presented at the 42nd Annual Gatlinburg Conference, New
Orleans.
Waford, R. N., Pratt, N., Warren, C., Brian, E., Kheirandish-Gozal, L., Molfese, D.
(February, 2008). Variations in event-related potentials across time and sleep
duration. Poster presented at Annual Meeting of International
Neuropsychological Society, Waikoloa, HI.
Pope, J., Waford, R. N., & McDade, A. (February, 2008). It’s your turn to serve: An
examination of attitudes toward the jury system. Society of Personality and Social
Psychology Annual Conference, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Waford, R. N., Bayarsaihan, N., Gozal, D., Molfese, V., & Molfese, D. L. (October,
2007). Sex Differences and Electrophysiological Correlates of Attention Deficits
using the CPT II. Poster presented at Research!Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky.
Armstrong, N. E., Barnes, M. E., Waford, R. N., Bayarsaihan, N., Gozal, D., Molfese, V.,
& Molfese, D. L. (October, 2007). Event Related Potentials Mediate Performance
on RBANS Based on Alteration of Sleep-Wake Cycles. Poster presented at
Research!Louisville, Louisville, KY.
Molfese, D. L. & Waford, R. N. (Invited Presentation, October, 2007). The Science of
Living in Space. Louisville Science Center, Research!Louisville Conference.
Louisville, KY.
Waford, R. N., Pratt, N. L., Warren, C. G., Millis, B. G., & Molfese, D. L. (June, 2007).
Effects of sleep restriction on speech discrimination in children. Poster presented
at the 21st Annual Meeting of the APSS, Minneapolis, MN.
Millis, B. G., Molfese, D. L., Warren, C. G., Pratt, N. L., & Waford, R. N. (June, 2007).
Brain responses predict impact of sleep loss on attention. Poster presented at the
21st Annual Meeting of the APSS, Minneapolis, MN.
Pope-Terrence, J. & Waford, R.N. (March, 2007). It's your time to serve: An examination
of attitudes toward jury service. Poster presented at the annual meeting of Off the
Witness Stand: Using Psychology in the Practice of Justice, New York, NY.
Molfese, D. L., Waford, R., Warren, C., Pratt, N., Brian, E., Barnes, M., Gozal, D., &
Molfese, P. (February, 2007). Brain organization during an attention task
changes following minor sleep loss and head-down tilt. Paper presented at NASA
Human Research Program Investigators’ Workshop, League City, Texas.
Wu, J., Molnar, A., Wagner, M., Waford, R. N., Warren, C., & Molfese, D. L. (February,
2007). Sex Differences In Attention Across ERP and Near-Infrared Procedures
On The Same Participants. Poster presented at International Neuropsychological
Society, Portland, Oregon.
Molnar, A., Wagner, M., Wu, J., Waford, R. N., Warren, C., & Molfese, D. L. (February,
2007). ERP and Near-Infrared Procedures in the Same Subjects Indicate Similar
Brain Regions Activated. Poster presented at International Neuropsychological
Society, Portland, Oregon.
Molfese, D. L., Waford, R. N., Warren, C., Pratt, N. Barnes, M., Roman, A., Stone,
M., Gozal, D., & Molfese, V. (Invited Presentation, November, 2006). Cognitive
Impact of Weightlessness in NASA Astronauts. Paper presented at Kentucky
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Psychological Association, Louisville, KY.
Molnar, A., Wagner, M., Wu, J., Waford, R. N., & Molfese, D. L. (October, 2006).
Spatio-temporal characteristics of auditory oddball processing using ERP and
near-infrared procedures. Poster presented at Research!Louisville, Louisville,
Kentucky.
Wu, J., Molnar, A., Wagner, M., Waford, R., Warren, C., & Molfese, D. L. (October,
2006). Sex differences in oddball task across ERP and Near-infrared methodology.
Poster presented at Research!Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky.
Molfese, D. L., Wu, J., Molnar, A., Wagner, M., & Waford, R. N. (August, 2006). The
use of high-density array event-related potentials and near-infrared technologies to
provide spatio-temporal insights into language processing. Paper presented at
International Society on Oxygen Transport to Tissue, Louisville, KY.
Pope-Terrence, J. & Waford, R. N. (June, 2006). Why Me? Attitudes toward serving on
the jury. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Democracy
Project, Snowbird, UT.
Lemerise, E. A., Arsenio, W. F., & Waford, R. N. (June, 2006). Contextual effects on
“Happy Victimizer” expectancies in normally developing and behaviorally
disruptive children. Poster presented at the annual meeting of Jean Piaget Society,
Baltimore, MD.
Waford, R. N., Lemerise, E. A., & Blanton, E. (May, 2006). The impact of friends and
enemies on young children's adjustment at school. Poster presented at the annual
meeting of the American Psychological Society, New York, NY.
Waford, R. N., Lemerise, E. A., McCormick, B. G., & Bowersox, A. L. (April, 2006).
Assessing Head Start children’s school adjustment. Poster presented at the
biennial meeting of the Conference of Human Development, Louisville, KY.
Lovitt, B., Waford, R. N. & Lemerise, E. A. (November, 2005). The impact of dyadic
relationships on elementary school children. Paper presented at the annual
meeting of the Kentucky Academy of Science, Richmond, KY.
Waford, R. N., Lemerise, E. A., McCormick, B. G., Bowersox, A. L, & Livingstone, G.
(November, 2005). Having friends matters: An investigation of the impact of
friendship on the school adjustment of preschool-age children. Paper presented at
the annual meeting of the Kentucky Academy of Science, Richmond, KY.
GRANT APPLICATIONS AND EXTERNAL FUNDING
Lewine, R. (PI), & Waford, R. N. A study of thinking and feeling in schizophrenia and
schizoaffective disorder. Intramural Research Incentive Grants: Research
Initiation Grant, University of Louisville, January 1-Decemeber 31, 2012, $4000.
Lewine, R. (PI), Sommers, A. & Waford, R. N. Mood induction, critical thinking, and
cognitive flexibility. SUN Grant, Delphi Center, University of Louisville,
January 1- December 31, 2009, $5,000.
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Undergraduate Courses:
Spring 2012

Abnormal Psychology, Undergraduate: Guest Lecturer and Teaching Assistant

•
•
•
	
  

Met with students as needed for further tutoring
Assisted in the development of exams
Developed and presented two lectures during the semester
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Quantitative Statistics, Undergraduate: Lab Instructor
Develop a curriculum to supplement instructor’s weekly class content
Grade all lab assignments
• Meet with students as needed for further tutoring
Spring 2011
Experimental Psychology, Undergraduate: Lab Instructor
• Developed a curriculum to teach steps necessary to successfully write a
research paper
• Graded all lab assignments
• Met with students as needed for further tutoring
Fall 2010
Abnormal Psychology, Undergraduate: Guest Lecturer
• Developed a lecture discussing thought disorder and severe psychopathology
• Presented lecture to two classes
July 2008-June 2009
Introduction to Psychology, Undergraduate: Lab Instructor
• Taught weekly lab sections, providing information supplementary to large
course lecture
Fall 2011

•
•

CLINICAL EXPERIENCE
July 2012-Present

Doctoral Intern, Prevention and Recovery in Early Psychosis
(PREP): The PREP clinic is an outpatient clinic and day program
dedicated to the understanding and treatment of first-episode
psychosis. This population of 16-30 year old young adults has
experienced their first psychotic episode in the last five years and
is in varying stages of the illness and recovery. Treatment
includes individual psychotherapy, group psychotherapy,
neuropsychological testing (MATRICS), individual family
therapy, and the Multi-Family Group model of family therapy.
Other features of the program include Cognitive Enhancement
Therapy (CET) and opportunities to participate in relevant
research related to first episode psychosis. Supervisor: Michelle
Friedman-Yakoobian, Ph.D.

July 2012-Present

Doctoral Intern, Massachusetts Mental Health Center –
Continuing Care clinic (MMHC-CC): The MMHC-CC is a
Department of Mental Health outpatient clinic offering
individual psychotherapy and psychological testing to adults
with severe and persistent mental illness living in a variety of
outpatient and supported settings. The majority of clients seen at
MMHC-CC are living with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, or
other psychotic disorders and severe psychopathology.
Supervisor: Nora Otero, M.Ed., LMHC.

July 2012-Present

Doctoral Intern, Massachusetts Mental Health Center- Southard
Clinic (MMHC-Southard): The MMHC-Southard is an
outpatient clinic offering individual psychotherapy and
psychological testing to adults experiencing a variety of
psychiatric difficulties. Clients have been seen for mood
disorders, anxiety disorders, and personality disorders.
Supervisor: June Wolf, Ph.D.

August 2010-June 2012

Graduate Student Therapist, University of Louisville
Psychological Services Center (PSC): Psychotherapeutic
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services are provided at the PSC. The PSC is a community
clinic that offers treatment for a variety of psychological
problems and accepts payment on a sliding scale. Psychotherapy
is provided from a Cognitive-Behavior Therapy orientation and
includes exposure and response prevention interventions.
Clients have been seen for obsessive-compulsive disorder, social
anxiety, generalized anxiety disorder, depression, post-traumatic
stress disorder, and personality disorders. Supervisor: Janet
Woodruff-Borden, Ph.D.
August 2009-June 2012

Graduate Student Therapist, Assessment: Assessment services
are provided at the University of Louisville Psychological
Services Center (PSC). Testing experience includes work with
both children and adults for a variety of referral questions. Child
assessment experience involves evaluation for eligibility for the
advance placement program at Jefferson County Public Schools.
This battery includes intelligence testing and collateral reports.
Adult assessment experience encompasses evaluation for
learning disabilities, Asperger’s disorder, ADHD, and
personality disorders. These batteries include semi-structured
interviews, intellectual and achievement testing, personality
assessment, neuropsychological testing, and self and observer
reports. Supervisors: Bernadette Walter, Ph.D. and David
Winsch, Ph.D.

February 2011-August 2011

Practicum Student: University of Louisville Hospital,
Emergency Psychiatric Services. This practicum consisted of
participation in morning treatment team meetings, including
observing and conducting new patient interviews. Research for
various local patient resources was also completed. Patients
were seen for personality disorders, psychosis, substance abuse,
suicidal ideation, depression, anxiety, panic disorder, and violent
behavior. Supervisors: Dr. Richard Lewine, Ph.D. and Dr.
Rifaat El-Mallakh, M.D.

February 2011-August 2011

Practicum Student: University of Louisville Hospital, Inpatient
psychiatric unit. Time on the inpatient psychiatric unit was spent
participating in physician rounds and observing meetings
between patients and the supervising psychiatrist. Daily case
conference meetings were also attended to observe treatment
team discussions about patients currently on the unit.
Supervisors: Dr. Richard Lewine, Ph.D. and Dr. Rifaat ElMallakh, M.D.

July 2009-July 2010

Practicum student, Central State Hospital: This 20-hour/week
placement provided exposure to a diverse clinical population and
an array of responsibilities. Patients included (1) a range of ages
from young adult to geriatric, (2) a variety of cultural groups, (3)
experience with a range of disabilities including physical
disabilities, hearing impairment, and low intellectual
functioning, (4) and exposure to a myriad of different diagnoses
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and levels of symptom severity. Responsibilities consisted of
individual therapy with patients experiencing depression, bipolar
disorder, psychoses, substance abuse, anxiety disorders,
personality disorders, suicidal ideation, and autism-spectrum
disorders. Weekly group therapy was also conducted, as were
suicide risk evaluations, and testing including but not limited to
personality assessment, intellectual assessment, mental status,
malingering assessment, and assessment of independent living
skills. In addition, as a member of the interdisciplinary team,
responsibilities involved presenting relevant information from
therapy sessions and testing results to the treatment team.
Supervisor: James Putnam, Psy.D.
August 2008-August 2010

Graduate Student Therapist, University of Louisville
Psychological Services Center (PSC): Psychotherapeutic
services were provided at the PSC, a community clinic that
offers treatment for a variety of psychological problems and
accepts payment on a sliding scale. Psychotherapy was provided
from an Integrative Psychotherapy orientation. Techniques
learned and implemented included Cognitive Behavior Therapy,
Narrative Therapy, Family Systems Therapy, and Mindfulness
and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy. Clients were seen
for personality disorders, depression, adjustment disorders, and
prodromal psychotic symptoms. Supervisor: Jay Irby, Ph.D.

RELEVANT WORK EXPERIENCE
August 2003-May2006
•
•
•

Eastern State Hospital, Lexington, KY: Mental Health
Technician
Provided support and milieu therapy with adult population
Assisted inpatients with activities of daily living and other daily needs
Unit populations included:
o Geriatric
o Acute psychiatric illness
o Chronic psychiatric illness
o Secure unit with highly aggressive population

May 2003-August 2003
•
•
•
•

	
  

Rivendell Behavioral Health Services, Bowling Green, KY:
Mental Health Technician
Provided support and milieu therapy with child and adolescent population
Conducted daily group therapy on a variety of different topics
Assisted inpatients with activities of daily living and other daily needs
Unit populations included:
o Residential Substance Abuse Treatment - Adolescent
o Acute psychiatric illness - Adolescent
o Acute psychiatric illness - Child
o Residential sex offender treatment – Adolescent
o Residential treatment for sexually reactive youth - Child
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SERVICE EXPERIENCE
September 2011
July 2009-July 2012
July 2009-June 2011

Society for Research in Psychopathology: 2011 Student
Contributor, Publication Committee
Peer Mentor for incoming graduate students
Student Representative, Clinical Psychology Doctoral Program

OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES AND AFFILIATIONS
Massachusetts Mental Health Center, Psychosis Working Group: Identifying and developing
measures of treatment efficacy and recovery
American Psychological Association – student member
Society for Research in Psychopathology – associate member
Kentucky Psychological Association – student member

PROFESSIONAL REFERENCES
Richard R. J. Lewine, Ph.D.
University of Louisville
Life Sciences Building, Rm. 343
Louisville, KY 40292
502-852-3243
rich.lewine@louisville.edu
Michelle Friedman-Yakoobian, Ph.D.
Commonwealth Research Center
Massachusetts Mental Health Center
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center
CEDAR Clinic 5th Floor
75 Fenwood Road
Boston, MA 02115
617-754-1210
mfriedm3@bidmc.harvard.edu
June Wolf, Ph.D.
Massachusetts Mental Health Center
75 Fenwood Road
Boston, MA 02115
617-626-9444
june_wolf@hms.harvard.edu
Chris Morse, Ph.D.
Massachusetts Mental Health Center
75 Fenwood Road
Boston, MA 02115
617-626-9443
cmorse1@bidmc.harvard.edu
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